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Abstract
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading,
thereby facing an externality if firms raise funds from multiple sources. We analyze whether
investors’ ability to design financial covenants that may include exclusivity clauses mitigates
this externality. Following covenant violations, investors can accelerate the repayment of their
loan, adjust its size, or increase interest rates. Enlarging contracting opportunities generates
a severe market failure: with covenants, equilibria are indeterminate and Pareto ranked. We
show that an investors-financed subsidy scheme to entrepreneurs alleviates the incentive to
overborrow and sustains the competitive allocation as the unique equilibrium one.
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1 Introduction
When they provide capital to firms, investors do not always control all the financial transactions
firms enter into. To the extent that outside financing affects firms’ behavior and their ability to
meet contractual obligations, the possibility of side trading creates an externality for investors: if
an entrepreneur borrows from multiple sources, she may have less incentives to improve financial
performance, which in turn affects each lender’s profit. Whether this externality can be internalized
by letting agents design appropriate financial contracts is a central question for the regulation of
modern capital markets. Yet, it remains largely unanswered. As a matter of fact, the financial
literature has either evaded the issue by postulating that agents enforce exclusive relationships from
the outset, or magnified the problem by considering an extreme form of nonexclusivity whereby
few, if any, contractual instruments can limit side trading. Capital markets probably fall between
these two extremes. On the one hand, no legal system imposes that entrepreneurs must raise funds
from a single investor. On the other hand, financial transactions are seldom secret and investors can
use the available information to design financial covenants in an attempt to curb firms’ financing
policy.
This paper combines these two elements to study the functioning of capital markets subject
to moral hazard. Our fundamental insight is that competition over sophisticated contracts, that
potentially include exclusivity clauses, leads to a severe market failure. The result challenges
the conventional view that a system of contracts fully contingent on additional financing is able
to enforce exclusive trading and foster market efficiency. As a consequence, to circumvent the
externality induced by side trading, a mere increase in the transparency of trades may be more of
a problem than a solution. Financial regulation should explicitly take into account the investors’
strategic use of information.
Investors’ contract design under the threat of competition is a relevant issue in corporate fi-
nance. In practice, firms can enter into multiple financial relationships and investors extensively
use financial covenants in their contracts to define thresholds of financial ratios that firms must
comply with.1 Since violating such covenants triggers penalties, this is a way for investors to con-
1Rauh and Sufi (2010) document that most large rated firms simultaneously use different types and sources of
corporate debt. According to Roberts and Sufi (2009), almost 97% of credit agreements contain financial covenants,
90% of which limit implicitly or explicitly firms’ ability to raise additional debt (see also Demiroglu and James (2010)).
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trol firms’ financing policy. Intuitively, the ability to design covenants should enhance competition
by limiting firms’ opportunity to raise additional funds, thereby eliminating the source of the exter-
nality. In a strategic context, however, covenants can act as a barrier to entry to protect incumbents’
rents against the threat of new offers.2
These effects are analyzed in the following model. A representative entrepreneur seeks funds
to invest in a project subject to moral hazard: she has to forgo a private benefit and exert effort to
increase the project’s profitability. A finite number of investors compete by simultaneously offering
menus of financial contracts. If the entrepreneur’s aggregate investment is observable, contracts
can include financial covenants. The entrepreneur selects one contract in each menu, possibly
raising funds from several investors, and chooses an effort level. If, in a given state of nature,
the sum of payments promised to investors exceeds the firm’s cash flow, then, given her limited
liability, the entrepreneur strategically defaults.3 All the cash flow is then seized by investors, but
the entrepreneur’s private benefit is inalienable.
Our benchmark is a fully nonexclusive setting: investors cannot write financial covenants, i.e.
they are restricted to trade bilateral contracts with the entrepreneur. In this context, we provide a
complete characterization of equilibrium allocations. Despite the fact that investors earn a positive
profit at equilibrium, all aggregate allocations are constrained efficient. The result is robust, in the
sense that it is established by allowing investors to post arbitrary menus of contracts.
We next introduce financial covenants. Covenants prescribe punishments to the entrepreneur
when she departs from a target financing policy. To the extent that the latter is determined by
the entire profile of investors’ offers, this introduces a degree of "contractibility of contracts" and
allows us to explore the investors’ ability to write exclusive contracts in a strategic setting. In
our analysis, the set of punishments available to investors depends on when the information on
outside financing is obtained, and it is sufficiently large to include the penalties commonly observed
following a covenant violation: acceleration of the loan repayment, adjustment of the initial loan
size, or raise in the interest rate.
We first consider that investors only observe the firm’s financing policy after the project is un-
2The possibility that exclusive contracts play an anticompetitive role has been suggested by Aghion and Bolton
(1987) in a monopolistic setting with no side trading externality.
3Default is denoted strategic because it is determined by the contracts chosen by the entrepreneur.
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dertaken. Covenants then allow them to modify interest rates according to the entrepreneur’s level
of outside debt. The entrepreneur’s limited liability sets an upper bound on the monetary penalties
that any investor can impose when she trades with others. As a consequence, financial covenants
do not have the power to simply forbid multiple financial relationships. They do however introduce
new strategic interactions compared to the benchmark case of fully unobservable side trades. Each
deviating investor can exploit the protection of covenants to serve the market alone by punishing,
up to the realized cash flows, the entrepreneur’s attempt to raise funds from multiple financiers. At
the same time, any incumbent investor can write covenants to prevent his competitors from pro-
viding additional investment and complementing existing offers. We show that the combination
of these two effects leads to an indeterminacy: a large number of Pareto ranked allocations are
sustained at equilibrium.
We next modify the information structure and allow investors to observe outside financing
before production takes place. This enlarges de facto the class of available financial covenants: in-
vestors can adjust their contractual terms according to the entrepreneur’s intended financial policy.
In particular, they can include loan acceleration clauses if they observe excessive debt issuance,
or propose additional financing if they observe insufficient borrowing. This second feature can be
interpreted as a contingent line of credit. It turns out that the strategic provision of lines of credit
discourages more competitive offers backed by a loan acceleration clause. This reinforces the idea
that enlarging investors’ contractual opportunities does not enhance competition. Overall, the same
indeterminacy result holds.
On the normative side, indeterminacy of market equilibria provides a natural setting to study
how a proper design of the market fosters investors’ incentives to supply capital. We construct a
system of subsidies from investors to the entrepreneur, that grants her a transfer if her investment is
too low. This system enables one investor to exploit gains from trade with a more competitive offer
by alleviating the entrepreneur’s resulting incentive to default. Investors do not choose the size of
the subsidies but have the option to finance them or not. The decision results from comparing
the cost of the subsidy for each investor and his gain from avoiding default when the transfer
is provided to the entrepreneur. We show that a subsidy scheme can be designed so that all gains
from trade are exploited, and only the competitive allocation is sustained at equilibrium. This result
provides a possible foundation for regulatory schemes that make banks or financial intermediaries
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financially liable whenever their strategic interactions exacerbate the risk of default. Examples
of related market institutions include the guarantee funds of central clearinghouses in derivative
markets or the recent Single Resolution Fund (SRF) of the European banking union.
Relationship to the literature
Our paper is linked to the general issue of side trading in financial markets,4 and more directly
speaks to the literature on nonexclusive competition that endogenizes side trading opportunities as
part of the strategies of competing investors. Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Kahn and Mookher-
jee (1998) are the first to establish that nonexclusivity creates an externality in financial markets
subject to moral hazard. Parlour and Rajan (2001) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) explicitly con-
sider strategic competition among lenders. They show that, compared to a hypothetical exclusive
competition benchmark, nonexclusivity typically reduces trades and generates an extra profit for
investors.5 In these models, financial contracts are bilateral in essence: no supplier can condition
his offers on the customer’s entire profile of trades. Bilateral contracting does not fit well with the
practice of modern capital markets in which investors set punishments based on entrepreneurs’ fi-
nancial policies. We therefore study financial relationships when investors write general contracts
that may include exclusive clauses. We show that the use of such contracts generates a severe
market failure. Multiple Pareto ranked allocations are sustained at equilibrium.
Equilibrium indeterminacy is a major result of the competing mechanism literature in which
principals compete through mechanisms in face of several privately informed agents. Yamashita
(2010), Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013), Peters (2015), and Han (2014) provide different
versions of a Folk Theorem: if no restriction is put on the set of available mechanisms, then a
very large number of allocations can be supported at equilibrium. These results crucially hinge
on having multiple agents. A contribution of our analysis is hence to present a standard economic
setting in which indeterminacy arises with a single agent thanks to the strategic role of covenants.6
Strategic default is also modeled as the entrepreneur’s ability to divert cash instead of repaying
4See for instance Allen and Gale (2004) or Farhi et al. (2009).
5A form of market breakdown also arises in adverse selection settings, where nonexclusivity often leads to Akerlof
(1970)-like results (Attar et al. (2011) and Attar et al. (2014)).
6Similar insights arise in the game-theoretic analysis of Szentes (2015) who characterizes equilibria of games in
which several principals can write potentially sophisticated contractible contracts.
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investors in multiple lending relationships: Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) offer the view that hav-
ing multiple lenders weakens the incentive to default by affecting ex post renegotiation between
parties. Bolton and Jeanne (2009) apply this analysis to sovereign lending, showing that govern-
ments prefer to issue different types of debt. In these models, the incentive to default arises from
the impossibility to write contracts contingent on cash flows. In contrast, we allow for contingent
contracts, and we emphasize that the possibility to have multiple financiers is at the origin of the
entrepreneur’s willingness to default.7
The paper is also linked to the literature on covenants in financial contracts. The conven-
tional approach is to study how covenants can mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and
debtholders (Smith and Warner (1979), Myers (1977)). Much attention has been devoted to ex-
plain how covenants affect renegotiation between parties (Gorton and Kahn (2000), Gârleanu and
Zwiebel (2009)). We take a different view and investigate how the design of covenants affects
competition between debtholders.
Several regulatory mechanisms have been suggested to mitigate the damaging implications of
side trading. Some rely on enhancing the observability of trades. Acharya and Bisin (2014) con-
struct a centralized clearing mechanism that sustains efficiency of market equilibria. Bennardo et
al. (2015) study the role of credit bureaus in a fully nonexclusive setting and show that information
sharing systems decrease investors’ rents, although they can worsen credit rationing. Both mech-
anisms fail to take into account the strategic design of contracts by individual investors. We show
that this possibility creates barriers to entry that resist regulations enhancing the observability of
trades. In our analysis, financial covenants are responsible for market inefficiencies whenever in-
vestors can observe outside debt. Others point out the role of repayment rules in case of default.
In particular, Bisin and Rampini (2006) put forward the idea that the institution of bankruptcy can
improve on nonexclusive contractual relationships but is not a perfect substitute for exclusivity.
In our setting, market failures arise even if a bankruptcy procedure imposes repayment priority
or captures part of the entrepreneur’s private benefit. In both cases, the threat of overborrowing
is sufficiently strong to impede perfect competition. A third class of mechanisms involves trans-
fers to distressed agents in order to affect their willingness to trade. Tirole (2012) and Philippon
and Skreta (2012) stress the fact that a regulator can repurchase assets, reducing adverse selection
7We argue in Section 4 that our results extend to the case in which the entrepreneur can also divert funds.
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and restoring agents’ participation on the private market. Our subsidy scheme exhibits a similar
feature in a moral hazard setting. From the viewpoint of an investor, providing a subsidy modi-
fies the entrepreneur’s incentive to default which in turn affects the investor’s willingness to pay
for it. An important difference with Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) is that in our
case the subsidy is entirely financed by the lending sector without resorting to an external costly
source of funds. We therefore provide a rationale for the private regulation of counterparty risk
through a collective transfer system, in the spirit of the guarantor function performed by central
clearinghouses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is exposed in Section 2. The
benchmark case in which investors offer bilateral contracts is analyzed in Section 3, while Section
4 studies the impact of covenants on equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 is devoted to market de-
sign. Proofs are provided either in the Appendix or in the additional Appendix A. The additional
Appendices B, C and D provide robustness results.
2 The model
We build on the standard capital market model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998).
Agents, technology and preferences. We consider a production economy populated by a single
representative entrepreneur and a finite number N of investors. At date 0, the entrepreneur owns
a variable size project that generates at date 1 a random output over two verifiable states: an
investment of I ≥ 0 yields a cash flow GI with G > 0 if the project succeeds, and a cash flow of
0 if it fails. The probability distribution over states depends on an unobservable effort e = {L,H}
chosen by the entrepreneur. Let (pie, 1− pie) be the distribution induced by effort e, where pie is the
probability of success. Denote e = H the high level of effort, and assume that piH > piL. If the
entrepreneur selects e = L, she receives a private benefit B ≥ 0 per unit invested in the project.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998), the investment project has a positive net present value
if and only if the entrepreneur selects e = H , that is:
piHG > 1 > piLG+B. (1)
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The entrepreneur is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. She has a verifiable endowment
of A > 0 and can raise additional funds by trading financial contracts issued by competing in-
vestors. If she raises I units of funds, invests her endowment A, pays back R in case of success,
and 0 in case of failure, her net payoff is piH
(
G(I + A) − R) − A if she chooses e = H , and
piL
(
G(I + A) − R) + B(I + A) − A if she chooses e = L. The expected profit of investor i
when he lends Ii to the entrepreneur and obtains Ri in case of success and 0 in case of failure, is
pieRi − Ii for a given effort e ∈ {L,H}.
Contracts, default, and equilibrium. Investors compete by offering arbitrary menus of finan-
cial contracts to the entrepreneur.8 The entrepreneur can simultaneously trade with any subset
of investors, optimally choosing the aggregate investment and the corresponding repayment by
combining available contracts. The nature of a financial contract depends on the variables that
we assume to be observable. In most of our analysis, a contract is an individual investment and
a function that associates a repayment to each amount of aggregate outside financing. Given the
entrepreneur’s limited liability, the repayment is always set equal to zero if the project fails. More
formally, a contract proposed by investor i is an array Ci = (Ii, Ri(.)), where Ii is the investment
he supplies, and Ri(.) : R+ → R is the function specifying the repayment he requires when the
project succeeds, for each I . In Section 4.2, we allow investors to also observe the aggregate fi-
nancing raised by the entrepreneur before production takes place and to modify their initial offer
(Ii, Ri(.)) accordingly. The following timing of events describes our competition game:
1. Each investor i offers a menuMi, that is a set of contracts which includes the null one (0, 0).9
2. Given these offers, the entrepreneur chooses one contract in each menu and an effort level.
3. The uncertainty is realized and payments are made.
Being protected by limited liability, the entrepreneur can trade contracts which involve con-
flicting prescriptions. In these situations, the outside financing I =
∑
i
Ii is such that the aggregate
contractual repayment R =
∑
i
Ri(I) > G(I + A), and we say that strategic default takes place.
8Investors can therefore include contracts that are not traded at equilibrium. Menus are sufficiently general to
reproduce any bilateral communication between investors and the entrepreneur (Martimort and Stole (2002), Peters
(2001)).
9This is done to incorporate agents’ participation decisions in a simple way.
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The entrepreneur’s payoff can hence be written as
U(I, R, e) =
 piH
(
G(I + A)−R)+ − A if e = H
piL
(
G(I + A)−R)+ +B(I + A)− A if e = L, (2)
and her reservation utility is U(0) ≡ (piHG− 1)A, which is strictly positive given (1).
Under strategic default, the entrepreneur chooses e = L to obtain her private benefit. Investors
cannot be repaid according to contractual terms, and a pro rata rule applies: each investor receives
a share of the cash flow proportional to his investment.10 The expected profit of investor i is
Vi(Ii, Ri(I), I, R, e) = pie
[
G
(
I + A
)Ii
I
1{R>G(I+A)} +Ri(I)1{R≤G(I+A)}
]− Ii. (3)
A pure strategy for the entrepreneur is a mapping that associates to each profile of investors’
menus
(
M1,M2, ...,MN
)
a vector of contracts
(
C1, C2, ..., CN
)
and an effort choice e ∈ {L,H}.
A pure strategy for investor i is a menu Mi.11 Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibria. Observe that the entrepreneur necessarily selects e = H at
equilibrium: given (1), investors’ aggregate profit is negative if e = L, which implies that at least
one active investor would strictly prefer not to participate.
Feasible and second-best allocations. We denote H = {(I, R) ∈ R2+ : U(I, R,H) ≥
U(I, R, L)} the set of (I, R) pairs inducing e = H as an optimal choice, and L = {(I, R) ∈ R2+ :
U(I, R,H) ≤ U(I, R, L)} those inducing e = L. For a given profile of menus, the entrepreneur’s
choices determine agents’ final allocations, that is, investments and actual repayments. If there is
no strategic default, investors are repaid according to contractual terms, in which case we refer to
(I, R) as an aggregate allocation.
We say that an allocation {(I1, R1(I)), ..., (IN , RN(I)), (I, R)} is feasible if (I, R) ∈ H, and
if it guarantees to any agent at least his reservation utility. The corresponding set F of aggregate
10We discuss in the additional Appendix C the case in which one investor can issue a senior claim.
11We make no specific assumption on the menus available to investors. We only require that they are compact sets so
that the entrepreneur’s choice problem of maximizing (2) over contracts and effort admits a solution for every profile(
M1,M2, ...,MN
)
. A direct way to ensure this is to assume for instance that each Ii belongs to a closed interval and
each Ri(.) is a bounded function.
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Figure 1: Set F of aggregate feasible allocations.
feasible allocations is depicted by the grey area in Figure 1. All such (I, R) allocations lie to the
right of the indifference curve relative to the entrepreneur’s reservation utility U(0), and to the
left of the line (O,Cc), which represents the aggregate zero profit condition for investors when
e = H . Condition (1) ensures that F is non-empty: when e = H , the entrepreneur’s marginal
rate of substitution G is greater than the investors’ one
1
piH
. Last, to ensure that e = H is optimal
for the entrepreneur, any aggregate feasible allocation must lie below the line that corresponds to
U(I, R,H) = U(I, R, L), which has a slope G− B
∆pi
. In line with Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
we also assume that
G− B
∆pi
<
1
piH
, (4)
where ∆pi = piH − piL, which ensures that F is closed. The frontier Ψ ≡ {(I, R) ∈ F :
U(I, R,H) = U(I, R, L)} in Figure 1 represents the set of second-best aggregate allocations:
a social planner who cannot control the entrepreneur’s effort but who can control final trades finds
optimal to select an aggregate allocation on Ψ. Indeed, (1) and (4) guarantee that starting from
any (I, R) ∈ Ψ, it is not possible to simultaneously increase the entrepreneur’s payoff and the
profit of all investors. Conversely, and using the same inequalities, one gets that for any allocation
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{(I1, R1(I)), ..., (IN , RN(I)), (I, R)} such that (I, R) /∈ Ψ, there is another feasible allocation
which Pareto-dominates it. Two relevant second-best aggregate allocations are Cc = (Ic, Rc),
which maximizes the entrepreneur’s payoff, and Cm = (Im, Rm), which maximizes the investors’
joint profit.
3 Market equilibria with bilateral contracts
We first assume that investors post menus of contracts contingent on the success or failure state,
but not on outside financing or on the final cash flow. This setting constitutes our benchmark
and corresponds to the standard representation of nonexclusive competition under moral hazard.
The credit card industry, in which credit card issuers cannot observe their customers’ portfolio of
credit cards, or the pure OTC markets, in which assets are traded outside of organized exchanges,
are good examples of this environment. A contract is then a pair (Ii, Ri) ∈ R2+, where Ii is an
investment level, and Ri is the repayment required by investor i in the success state.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
We derive below necessary conditions for an aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F to be supported at
equilibrium.
For a given profile of menus (M1,M2, ...,MN), the entrepreneur determines her credit demand
(I, R) by optimally combining investors’ offers. Since for each e ∈ {H,L}, her preferences are
linear in I and R, the corresponding choice problem is simple. As an illustration, suppose that
Mi = {(Ii, Ri); (0, 0)}, with Ii > 0. If strategic default does not take place, the entrepreneur is
willing to trade (Ii, Ri) if its price
Ri
Ii
is smaller than her corresponding marginal rate of substitu-
tion, irrespective of the other offered menus.12 If the entrepreneur chooses to default, she selects
the highest investment contract in each menu in order to maximize her private benefit.
The analysis of investors’ behavior is more involved. A crucial feature of nonexclusive com-
petition is that every investor may gain by offering contracts that the entrepreneur accepts in com-
bination with other offers. This makes the set of unilateral deviations very large compared to the
12This idea is formalized in Lemma 2 in the Appendix, which is key to the proof of our results.
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case in which exclusive relationships are assumed, and potentially difficult to characterize. Since
there are gains from trade when the entrepreneur chooses e = H , there is always room for devi-
ations that increase aggregate investment provided that they do not trigger e = L. The following
proposition builds on this intuition and provides a central result of this section.
Proposition 1 If (I∗, R∗) is an equilibrium aggregate allocation, then
U(I∗, R∗, H) = max(
(Ii,Ri)∈Mi
)
i=1,...,N
U(I, R, L). (5)
Since the right-hand side of (5) cannot be greater than the equilibrium payoff U(I∗, R∗, H),
Proposition 1 is straightforward if (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ. If (I∗, R∗) 6∈ Ψ, the intuition for the proposition
can easily be understood in a free entry equilibrium.13 Suppose that an entrant deviates by offering,
together with the null contract (0, 0), the additional contract
(
x, (
1
piH
+ ε)x
)
, of price
1
piH
+ ε, with
x and ε strictly positive. Choose ε small enough to guarantee that the price of this contract is
strictly less than the entrepreneur’s marginal rate of substitution G when e = H . Clearly, she picks
this contract at the deviation stage. For (I∗, R∗) to be supported at equilibrium, this choice must
induce e = L. Given that both x and ε can be arbitrarily small, investors’ equilibrium menus must
be such that (5) holds. In this nonexclusive context, (5) can be interpreted as an aggregate incentive
compatibility constraint. The allocations satisfying (5) are such that the threat of overborrowing
prevents any investor from profitably complementing existing offers. The welfare implications of
aggregate incentive compatibility are derived in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 If (I∗, R∗) is an equilibrium aggregate allocation, then (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ, i.e. equilibrium
allocations are second-best efficient.
Corollary 1 exploits a direct implication of Proposition 1: each contract traded at equilibrium,
combined with her preferred options in all other menus, must yield the entrepreneur the same
payoff whether she selects e = H or e = L. If this individual incentive compatibility condition
is violated, a single investor can straightforwardly deviate, even if his rivals post arbitrary menus.
The proof of Corollary 1 shows that individual incentive contraints are not compatible with the
aggregate condition (5) if (I∗, R∗) does not belong to the frontier Ψ.
13The proof of Proposition 1 is established for any fixed number of investors.
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Therefore, with bilateral contracts, investors successfully exploit the opportunity to comple-
ment their rivals’ offers, exhausting thereby all gains from trade. This efficiency result sheds light
on the welfare properties of nonexclusive markets under moral hazard. Indeed, while Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) obtain similar findings,14 they only provide par-
tial characterizations of market equilibria. In contrast, our result is robust in that it does not rely
on exogenous restrictions on investors’ menus or on the structure of equilibrium strategies.
3.2 Equilibrium aggregate allocations
We now provide a full characterization of equilibrium aggregate allocations in terms of the private
benefit B. To this end, we say that moral hazard is mild if B ≤ piHG − 1, and that it is strong
if B > piHG − 1. If moral hazard is mild, the entrepreneur’s marginal private benefit is lower
than the marginal return of the project with e = H . The severity of moral hazard affects the set of
profitable deviations and the resulting equilibrium outcomes, as formally stated below.
Proposition 2 The following holds:
1. If B ≤ piHG− 1, any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ can be supported at equilibrium.
2. If B > piHG− 1, (Im, Rm) is the unique equilibrium aggregate allocation.
Irrespective of the severity of moral hazard, there is always an equilibrium in which investors
earn a monopolistic profit. Suppose that one investor, say investor 1, offers M1 = {Cm =
(Im, Rm), (0, 0)}, and all other investors i 6= 1 propose Mi = {(0, 0)}. The proof of Proposi-
tion 2 shows that no investor can profitably deviate by inducing the entrepreneur to select e = H .
This is illustrated in Figure 2. Consider any investor i 6= 1: a deviation C ′i = (I ′i, R′i) is profitable
only if
R′i
I ′i
>
1
piH
. However, following any such deviation, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to
trade C ′i together with C
m and to select e = L, achieving U(C ′i +C
m, L) > U(C ′i, H). Therefore,
the opportunity to trade the monopolistic allocation together with a deviating contract makes the
low effort’s threat fully credible.
14Specifically, Proposition 5 in Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) and Proposition 4 in Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) provide
the following constrained efficiency result: even when equilibria fail to be second-best efficient, they are typically
efficient from the viewpoint of a planner who cannot control final trades (third-best efficiency). In our setting, all
equilibrium aggregate allocations belong to the second-best frontier Ψ, which therefore coincides with the third-best
one.
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Figure 2: The monopolistic allocation equilibrium.
Proposition 2 also states that, if moral hazard is strong, the monopolistic allocation is the only
one supported at equilibrium. The result is established by contradiction. Consider any aggregate
allocation on the frontier Ψ, and any investor who provides funding at equilibrium. Linearity of
the entrepreneur’s preferences guarantees that this investor is indispensable. This implies that if
he deviates by offering a higher-price, smaller-investment contract, the entrepreneur’s payoff is
reduced (irrespective of her effort choice). When B is high, her private benefit sharply decreases
and she chooses e = H which makes the deviation profitable. Monopoly then arises as the only
equilibrium allocation.
When B is small, and moral hazard is mild, any aggregate allocation on Ψ can be sustained at
equilibrium. The reason is that the above deviations induce e = L as the private benefit decreases
less than the entrepreneur’s payoff under e = H . In this case, only one investor is active and there
is at least another investor offering a positive investment contract. This contract is latent : despite
not being traded it needs to be issued for the equilibrium to exist. The latent contract serves the role
of a threat, that is, it ensures that the entrepreneur selects e = L following any investor’s deviation.
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Our benchmark incorporates the main insights of the literature on nonexclusive competition
under moral hazard. As in the credit economy of Parlour and Rajan (2001), monopoly is sustained
at equilibrium. As in the insurance settings of Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), Bisin and Guaitoli
(2004) or Attar and Chassagnon (2009), latent contracts are used to sustain credit rationing and
positive profit at equilibrium.15 At the same time, we contribute to this literature by providing a
complete equilibrium characterization and a full strategic analysis of a financial market in which
no information is available on aggregate trades.16
4 Market equilibria with covenants
Corporate financing relationships are not well-described by bilateral contracts. Most financial
contracts include covenants aimed at monitoring firms’ financial decisions by specifying target
debt ratios. In case of violations, creditors can accelerate the payment of their outstanding debt.
Empirical evidence suggests that they can also increase interest rates or reduce future lending.17
Building on these insights, we allow financial contracts to be contingent on outside financing.
To provide a thorough analysis of the strategic role of financial covenants, we distinguish two infor-
mational structures. First, we assume that outside financing is observed only after production takes
place. This enables investors to require higher interest rates when undesired levels of debt are ob-
served. We next allow investors to also observe the funds raised before they are invested. Investors
can exploit this information to accelerate the repayment of their loan, or to modify their initial
investment. We therefore consider the most favorable setting to enforce exclusive contracting: in-
vestors observe aggregate trades, and can use a very large set of punishments to deter departures
from their desired financing policy.
15A traditional criticism of latent contracts is that, to be attractive for the entrepreneur, they might be issued at a
loss-making price for investors. In our context, credit rationing and positive profits are either supported by such latent
contracts, or by the active Cm contract which is sufficient to sustain the monopolistic allocation equilibrium.
16Parlour and Rajan (2001) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) restrict investors to post single offers, while Bisin
and Guaitoli (2004) also consider piecewise linear menus. Allowing investors to compete over arbitrary menus may
sustain additional equilibria, as it is the case in the complete information setting of Martimort and Stole (2003) or in
the adverse selection one of Attar et al. (2011).
17Roberts and Sufi (2009) report that when creditors respond to covenant violations, they increase interest rates
on their loans in about half of the cases and that covenant violators exhibit a decline in their net debt issuing activ-
ity. Relatedly, Chava and Roberts (2008) find that covenant violations induce a 13% to 20% decline in the level of
investment.
14
4.1 Covenant violation after investment
We explore here the situation in which outside funding is only observed ex post. Enlarging in-
vestors’ contracting opportunities to include such debt-based covenants introduces new strategic
interactions. On the one hand, they have access to an additional class of deviations. Any investor
can set punishments to circumvent the entrepreneur’s threat to overborrow. In particular, they can
stipulate a raise in interest rates to eliminate the entrepreneur’s rent when she chooses e = L and
repays all investors. To illustrate this procompetitive effect, consider the monopolistic equilibrium
arising with bilateral contracts. With covenants, the simple offer (Im, Rm) is not robust to entry.
Any inactive investor can undercut it by proposing a small investment at a unit price slightly above
1
piH
, writing covenants that trigger default if additional funding is raised. By construction, the
entrepreneur is better off trading this deviating contract and choosing e = H , which makes the
deviation profitable.
On the other hand, any investor can use covenants to prevent his competitors from proposing
contracts to be traded in addition to his own. Under bilateral contracting, such deviations are key to
establish Corollary 1 and to show that all gains from trade are exploited at equilibrium. Covenants
could then undermine the constrained efficiency result. To isolate this latter anticompetitive effect,
we first present a stripped-down version of our model in which piL = 0, that is, strategic default
always occurs when e = L is chosen. This case corresponds to the standard framework of Parlour
and Rajan (2001) which is extended to allow investors to use covenants contingent on outside
financing.
Proposition 3 If piL = 0, any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F such that I∗ ≥ Im is sustained
at equilibrium.
Proposition 3 states that the use of covenants leads to an indeterminacy of equilibrium alloca-
tions. To provide an intuition for this result it is useful to describe equilibrium strategies. Every
investor proposes the same menu, which includes two non degenerate contracts on top of the null
one. The entrepreneur chooses the same contract in each menu, i.e. every investor is active. Equi-
librium contracts incorporate the following financial covenants. If the entrepreneur raises a large
amount of debt from other investors, covenants impose large penalties which can be interpreted as
an increase in interest rate. Given these covenants, the entrepreneur strategically defaults whenever
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an investor tries to gain by complementing existing offers. Symmetrically, if the entrepreneur does
not raise enough debt, covenants specify a reduction in the interest rate. This lower interest rate
is designed to guarantee that no investor is indispensable at equilibrium. This in turn blocks any
deviation of an investor who wishes to increase the price of his loan.
Equilibrium menus also include an additional high price, large investment contract. Although
investors anticipate that it will not be traded at equilibrium, this second contract is used as a threat
against the deviations of any investor trying to expand his market share. The contract is therefore
strategically issued by active investors to protect their rents and to induce collusive outcomes at
equilibrium.18
To clarify how inefficient allocations can be sustained at equilibrium, consider any (I∗, R∗) 6∈
Ψ. In contrast with bilateral contracts, the covenants issued by his competitors prevent a deviating
investor from gaining by complementing existing offers. He must therefore endeavor to replace
some (or all) of his competitors’ offers. Such deviations entail proposing a substantial amount
of investment. Since moral hazard is strong when piL = 0,19 the entrepreneur’s private benefit
from investing this amount together with the large loans issued by the others is greater than the
payoff of trading with the deviator, provided that I∗ ≥ Im. This shows that any (I∗, R∗) such
that I∗ ≥ Im is supported at equilibrium: equilibrium allocations are therefore Pareto-ranked.
Although all investors are active at equilibrium and each of them typically earns a strictly positive
profit, the corresponding outcome is entry-proof: given equilibrium covenants, no potential entrant
can do better than offering the null contract.20
If piL > 0, a deviating investor can fully exploit the procompetitive power of covenants to
undercut competing offers. The following proposition shows that indeterminacy and inefficiency
of equilibrium allocations still arise for any value of piL.
Proposition 4 There exists a thresholdN and a sequence of payoffs (UN)N>N withUN < U(I
c, Rc, H)
18The entrepreneur is indifferent between trading equilibrium contracts and defaulting on these large investment
contracts. In the latter case, investors lose money in the aggregate, which leads to question their rationality to post
such contracts in the first place. The fact that all investors are active and make a positive profit at equilibrium ensures
that issuing them can be optimal against the entrepreneur’s trembling behaviors.
19If piL = 0, then, given (4), we get B > piHG− 1.
20Our equilibria can therefore exhibit an arbitrary number of inactive investors: the proof of Proposition 3 suggests
that equilibrium allocations may alternatively be supported with two active investors who equally share the market and
N − 2 inactive ones who only offer the null contract (0, 0).
16
such that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying
U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ UN (6)
is sustained at equilibrium. When B > piHG− 1, limN→∞ UN = U(0).
From (6), the set of equilibrium allocations is non-empty whenever N > N . These alloca-
tions are characterized in terms of a threshold payoff UN , which role can be understood as follows.
For each N > N , any inefficient equilibrium is in principle vulnerable to the undercutting of an
investor who offers a contract including covenants designed to enforce exclusivity. When moral
hazard is strong, as suggested in the discussion of Proposition 3, these offers are more likely to
induce default as the amount of funds offered by the deviator gets larger, and can easily be cir-
cumvented. When moral hazard is mild, the opposite holds and deviations that entail a sufficiently
large investment can in principle induce e = H . The threshold UN is constructed to limit the
maximal amount of funds that a deviator can propose to exploit this opportunity, thereby deterring
such deviations.
A striking result of Proposition 4 is that, when moral hazard is strong, UN tends to U(0) as N
goes to infinity, that is, the entrepreneur can achieve any payoff above U(0). This stands in sharp
contrast with standard insights that oligopolistic rents are dissipated in the limit. The reason is that
when N is large, each investor’s contract has a negligible impact on the entrepreneur’s threat of
default. In this case, the threat of default is sufficient to prevent even those deviations that provide
a payoff to the entrepreneur slightly above U(0). We then get a Folk Theorem-like result: every
feasible allocation can be sustained at equilibrium. Therefore in the limit the level of B determines
the set of equilibrium aggregate allocations, as in the bilateral contracting setting of Section 3.
In contrast with that of Proposition 3, the proof of Proposition 4 relies on asymmetric equilib-
rium strategies. A subset of investors are active and equally share the market by offering contracts
with covenants similar to those exhibited in the case piL = 0. The remaining investors post latent
contracts in order to render the threat of default effective even when moral hazard is mild.21 The
investment available in each latent contract is decreasing with the total number of investors. As
21Observe that, since Proposition 4 also holds for piL = 0, Propositions 3 and 4 together imply that some aggregate
allocations can be sustained with different equilibrium strategies. Therefore indeterminacy also prevails regarding
investors’ equilibrium menus.
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N goes to infinity, the investment included in each latent contract tends to zero, and no investor is
indispensable to provide the threat of default. The aggregate available funds can then be seen as a
barrier to entry and the equilibrium interpreted as entry-proof.
The minimal number of investors N is finite, but it can in principle be large. We provide
however in the additional Appendix B an alternative profile of investors’ strategies guaranteeing
that indeterminacy arises with N = 2 for the general case piL ≥ 0 if the project’s profitability is
sufficiently high.
4.2 Covenant violation before investment
So far, our modeling only allows covenants to specify contractual penalties that can be enforced af-
ter investment is undertaken. In practice, covenant violations also entitle investors to accelerate the
repayment of their loan or to renegotiate credit facilities. We extend below our setting to introduce
the possibility for investors to observe all funds raised by the entrepreneur before investment takes
place. Investors can then demand the early repayment of all or part of their loan or alternatively
provide additional liquidity. We interpret these features as loan acceleration clauses and contingent
lines of credit, respectively.
To fix ideas, suppose that before investment takes place, any investor i can observe the aggre-
gate initial financing, denoted I0, raised by the entrepreneur. He can therefore commit to modify
his initial arrangement according to I0. In particular, he can withdraw any fraction of his initial
offer in order to protect himself against the threat of overborrowing.22 This could in principle
foster competition. We show below that these procompetitive effects of loan acceleration clauses
are undermined by the simultaneous issuance of lines of credit. As a consequence, equilibrium
allocations remain indeterminate.
More formally, define a contract for investor i as
(
Ii, Ri(.), I
+
i (.), R
+
i (.)
)
with Ii ≥ 0, I+i (I0) ≥
−Ii and Ri(.) and R+i (.) functions of the aggregate initial debt I0 and of the final outside financing
I . In this setting, a loan acceleration clause following an undesired level of debt I0 is written:
I+i (I0) = −Ii and R+i (I0, I) = −Ri(I0, I) ∀I. Similarly, a line of credit can be written: I+i (I0) >
0, and R+i (I0, I) = pI
+
i (I0), with I
+
i (I0) being the credit limit available at a unit price p. The
22This is indeed the most common rationale for the use of loan acceleration clauses in debt contracts.
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following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 Propositions 3 and 4 extend to the case in which investors can write covenants
contingent on the initial debt I0.
When the initial debt is observable, an investor can try to enforce exclusivity by asking to
be reimbursed if he observes additional debt issuance. Such a deviation is however blocked by
investors’ ability to offer lines of credit contingent on the initial debt. At equilibrium, investors do
not need to ask for an acceleration of their loan, and the entrepreneur does not draw on any line of
credit. Yet the presence of this additional source of liquidity undermines the threat of asking for
an early loan repayment. In general terms, Proposition 5 shows that the joint issuance of ex post
and ex ante debt-based covenants constitutes a barrier against any attempt of investors to enter the
market using sophisticated contracts.23
It is interesting to discuss to what extent these financial covenants are consistent with some
empirical observations on firms’ credit relationships. To start with, the equilibrium strategies of
Proposition 5 are such that investors do not ask for any acceleration of their loans. They do however
specify changes in interest rates following the violation of financial covenants resulting from firms’
multiple borrowing. This is in line with the observation that creditors do not ask for the early
repayment of their loan following a covenant violation but rather use this right to modify other
features of the firm’s financial policy, like the interest rate (Roberts and Sufi (2009)).
Next, at equilibrium, lines of credit are issued, and are not drawn upon, unless the borrower
modifies her investment policy. At the same time, investment is typically inefficiently low, and
firms are credit-rationed. Relatedly, Sufi (2009) points out that lines of credit are not fully com-
mitted and that their access is contingent on firms’ financial performance. This illustrates the idea
that lines of credit are not a perfect substitute for liquidity, and are strategically offered by banks,
as also emphasized by Acharya et al. (2014).
23The distinction between raised and invested funds creates a possibility for the entrepreneur to divert funds, which
can constitute an additional source of moral hazard. To illustrate its impact, suppose that the entrepreneur can divert
a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of the investment I + A. The relevant incentive constraint is then piH
(
G(I + A) − R) ≥
piL
(
G(1 − γ)(I + A) − R) + (γ + B)(I + A), since diverting is optimal when e = L, but not when e = H . The
constraint is binding whenever R =
(
G− B + γ(1− piLG)
∆pi
)
(I +A). If γ is not too large, conditions (1) and (4) are
satisfied, and the possibility of fund diversion is hence equivalent to an increase in B, which reinforces our results.
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More fundamentally, in our analysis, the strategic role of covenants is incorporated in investors’
out-of-equilibrium offers. The entire equilibrium capital supply therefore matters to determine
firms’ investment policy. The recent paper of Degryse et al. (2015) is the first to investigate the
effect of multiple lending on the supply of credit of a given bank. Their main result is that the
bank’s willingness to lend decreases when its customers contract loans with other lenders, unless
the bank loan is fully secured. Our work, which explicitly derives investors’ equilibrium best
responses, provides further insights. Both the willingness to lend and the contracts issued by a
bank depend on those covenants included in its competitors’ loans, which should therefore be
taken into account to identify banks’ credit supply. When competitors do not use covenants, a
bank can issue covenants that reduce the threat of dilution, leaving its capital supply unaffected.
Facing such covenants, a bank might be unable to secure its loan, which induces a reduction in
investment.
5 Market design under the threat of default
The protection offered by covenants turns out to be a double-edged sword. It encourages investors
to offer more competitive contracts, but it also prevents entry of potential competitors. The latter
effect dominates and a large number of low investment, inefficient allocations are sustained at
equilibrium. On the normative side, this calls for a proper design of the market architecture.
At the root of market inefficiency is the investors’ individual inability to prevent overborrowing
and strategic default. It is therefore natural to ask whether this threat can be mitigated by appro-
priately designed bankruptcy rules. We show however in the additional Appendices C and D that
our results survive the introduction of standard procedures. Precisely, Proposition C.1 analyzes
the case in which one investor has repayment priority over the others, and Proposition D.1 that in
which part of the entrepreneur’s private benefit is seized under bankruptcy. In both cases, a large
number of inefficient allocations are sustained at equilibrium.
We therefore consider an alternative way to circumvent overborrowing based on a market
mechanism in which investors can contribute to the provision of a subsidy to the entrepreneur.
This mechanism induces the entrepreneur not to default and sustains the competitive allocation as
the unique equilibrium one. We introduce in the next subsection a subsidy mechanism and discuss
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its empirical relevance in Subsection 5.2.
5.1 The subsidy game
Consider a subsidy scheme, conceived, say, by a market designer, such that for every observed
outside financing I , investor i is asked to pay a transfer Ti(I), with Ti(0) = 0. After the cash
flow realization, the entrepreneur receives a (possibly null) subsidy equal to the sum of investors’
transfers. This mechanism induces the following game:
1. Given (T1(.), T2(.), ..., TN(.)), each investor i offers a menu Mi of contracts that can include
any class of financial covenants.24
2. After observing all offers, each investor decides whether to pay his transfer or not.
3. The entrepreneur chooses a contract in each menu and makes her effort choice.
4. The uncertainty is realized, and payoffs are distributed according to financial contracts and
to the subsidy scheme.
We focus on the case piL = 0 which exacerbates the anticompetitive effect of covenants, and we
consider pure strategy subgame perfect symmetric equilibria. The following proposition highlights
the role of the subsidy in disciplining investors and resolving indeterminacy.
Proposition 6 If piL = 0, there is a profile of transfers (T1(.), T2(.), ..., TN(.)) such that (Ic, Rc) is
the unique aggregate allocation supported in a symmetric equilibrium of the subsidy game.
The intuition for Proposition 6 is the following. Suppose that an allocation different from
the competitive one is supported at equilibrium. In the absence of a subsidy scheme, we know
from the previous section that the entrepreneur’s threat to default hinders deviations by an investor
who tries to exploit gains from trade. We show that there exist individual transfers that guarantee
a profitable deviation for a well-chosen investor. The design of the subsidy scheme involves the
following trade-off. On the one hand, the subsidy provided to the entrepreneur has to be sufficiently
large to alleviate the threat of default and induce e = H at the deviation stage. On the other
24That is, the analysis applies to both the informational structures of Subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
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hand, investors must be willing to pay their individual transfers. To ensure their participation,
the mechanism is such that the entrepreneur’s subsidy, that is, the sum of individual transfers, is
strictly positive only if all investors accept to pay. This implies that the entrepreneur defaults in
the absence of the subsidy. Also, given that investors observe all offers when deciding whether
to pay or not, they can anticipate the entrepreneur’s behavior. Each investor prefers to contribute
whenever the cost to induce e = H is smaller than his loss following default. We construct
a subsidy scheme satisfying both requirements. Given this mechanism, no aggregate allocation
different from (Ic, Rc) can be supported in a symmetric equilibrium. The corresponding transfers
are simple: investors’ payments are linear and increasing in the entrepreneur’s investment unless
I = Ic, in which case they are null.25 This leaves (Ic, Rc) as the unique equilibrium aggregate
allocation.
To implement the above mechanism, the market designer only needs to observe investors’ par-
ticipation decisions on top of the realized investment I . The subsidy scheme therefore relies on
similar instruments compared to those available to investors.26 Also, in contrast with standard tax-
ation schemes, the mechanism cannot exclude non-participating agents from entering the market:
it relies on a voluntary contribution of investors. The question therefore arises of whether the same
subsidy scheme can be otherwise enforced by competing investors who individually design their
transfer schedules. Intuition suggests that this is not the case. Allowing investor i to pay a transfer
according to I is equivalent to letting him free to set a possibly negative repayment Ri(.). Since
we already allow repayments to take negative values in the general model of Section 2, the equi-
librium characterization of Proposition 3 would not be affected. We therefore stress the need for a
centralized entity with the power to commit to collect and redistribute resources according to the
volume of trades.
25To ensure equilibrium uniqueness in the investors’ participation subgame, we design transfers to guarantee that
participating is a dominant strategy. Precisely, each contributor is granted a reward if he participates and at least one
of the others does not.
26Indeed, financial covenants contingent on realized investment allow de facto to control the entrepreneur’s partici-
pation decision with every investor.
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5.2 Guarantee funds as subsidy mechanisms
The history of financial regulation offers many examples of privately financed mechanisms that
perform functions similar to those of our subsidy scheme. In modern futures markets, central
clearinghouses set up and manage guarantee funds to provide insurance against counterparty de-
fault (Kroszner (1999)).27 Credit markets also offer different types of rescue mechanisms sup-
ported by banks. During the Comptoir d’Escompte crisis in 1889 in Paris, the Banque de France
granted a loan to the insolvent Comptoir d’Escompte, asking other banks to provide a guarantee
to absorb losses on this loan (Hautcoeur et al. (2014)). A similar role was performed by the New
York Clearing House Association (NYCHA) before the creation of the Federal Reserve System in
1913. During a crisis, the NYCHA could allow its members to issue loan certificates, the payment
of which was guaranteed by the clearinghouse itself, that is, by the whole banking industry (Gor-
ton (1985)). More recently, the emerging European banking union has decided the creation of a
Single Resolution Fund that will be financed by European banks and that will help to restructure
distressed banks.28 Our analysis offers a rationale for market-based regulatory schemes that make
banks or financial intermediaries liable for the negative externalities stemming from their strategic
interactions. In the subsidy game, the threat to provide a subsidy has a disciplining effect on credit
markets, enhancing competition and decreasing rents. While it is hard to assess to what extent
actual guarantee mechanisms cope with counterparty externalities, some authors argue that they
do have a disciplinary role. In his analysis of the 1987 financial markets crash, Bernanke (1990)
points at the effectiveness of the clearinghouse institution as an insurance company. Riva and
White (2011) find evidence that during the nineteenth century, the number of brokers’ defaults at
the Paris Bourse decreases as the size of the guarantee fund relative to the volume of transactions
increases. Whether these insurance systems also affect the volume of trades and the size of the
market remains an open question.
Our mechanism shares important features with the above institutions. In particular, the subsidy
27OTC derivative markets can also organize some form of mutualization of losses across traders upon default of one
party. For instance, the stock brokers on the forward market at the Paris Bourse in the nineteenth century organized a
Common Fund to rescue defaulting brokers (Riva and White (2011)).
28Vice-President Michel Barnier, responsible for Internal Market and Services recently said: "To respond to the
financial crisis, we have worked hard to improve the financial system so that banks pay for themselves if they have
problems, and not the taxpayers. The detailed rules on resolution funds financed by the banking sector, adopted today,
are an important step to making that a reality." European Commission Press Release, October 21, 2014.
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scheme we suggest does not have the power to shut markets down: investors can refuse to subscribe
to the system of transfers, and still offer financial contracts. Relatedly, the European banking
union lets non-Euro-area banks free to participate to the Single Resolution Mechanism. Also, the
financial contributions of banks increase in the volume of the available investment. In practice,
the guarantee funds of clearinghouses are financed by members’ contributions that depend on the
volume of trades they generate, and therefore on their risk exposure.29 An important difference
with actual mechanisms is that our subsidy scheme does not involve a direct transfer from some
banks to others. It is therefore immune from the criticism that such bailouts create moral hazard
and induce the insured agents (banks or traders) to take excessive risk. Indeed, subsidizing the
entrepreneur when she invests too little does not provide incentives for banks to lend excessively.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that investors’ competition over financial contracts incorporating exclusivity
clauses does not necessarily lead to efficient outcomes in the presence of side trading. That is,
letting investors free to design financial covenants may exacerbate the negative effects of the coun-
terparty externalities. Our results suggest new ways to empirically identify investors’ behaviors
and the associated market outcomes. In particular, to measure the impact of side trading exter-
nalities in capital markets, one should look into the entire profile of investors’ offers. Observing
financial contracts that, although not traded, discourage the entry of rivals, along with covenants
contingent on outside financing would provide (indirect) evidence of such externalities.
On the theoretical side, our analysis calls for further research in two directions. The first one
relates to the degree of observability of outside financing. We focus on the two extreme cases of
either fully unobservable or fully observable outside debt. However, it might be easier for investors
to observe cash flows rather than total debt. For instance, some liabilities may be hidden in off-
balance sheet items. This raises the question of whether cash flow-based covenants introduce new
strategic effects. Intuitively, it could be difficult for an investor to detect multiple trades if the
29These are recurrent features in the history of common funds: at the Paris Bourse in the nineteenth century, most
of the Common Fund’s revenue came from a stamp tax on the paper used by brokers for their operations (White
(2007)). In the US, the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation created in 1925 built its reserve fund from the clearing
fees charged to its members (Kroszner (1999)).
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observed cash flow only provides an imperfect signal of outside debt, which might undermine the
anticompetitive role of covenants.30 More generally, since accounting principles determine the
informativeness of financial variables, this analysis could provide novel insights on the economic
implications of accounting standards.
The other interesting extension would be to explicitly consider repeated lending relationships
in the presence of strategic default. In such contexts, covenants can threaten to reduce borrowers’
future financing capacity. Reinforcing this coercitive role over a long horizon could thereby en-
hance their procompetitive effect. At the same time, the opportunities to side-trade extend to future
periods, which could generate a novel source of market failure. Exploring this tradeoff is relevant
to our understanding of the relationship between debt constraints and the performance of dynamic
economies.
30This effect cannot be captured in our model, in which both variables are informationally equivalent.
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Appendix
We first state Lemma 1 which is used in most of our proofs.
Lemma 1 The following holds:
1. Let (M1,M2, ...,MN) be a profile of arbitrary menus. Any entrepreneur’s best response
leading to strategic default induces a strictly negative profit to each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N .
2. Let (M1,M2, ...,MN) be a profile of menus of bilateral contracts. Any entrepreneur’s best
response leading to e = L induces a strictly negative profit to each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N .
PROOF
1. Suppose that (M1,M2, ...,MN) is a profile of arbitrary menus, and let (Ii, Ri(.)) be the
contract chosen by the entrepreneur inMi in a given best response. If the entrepreneur strategically
defaults, the profit to investor i is Vi = piLG(
∑
i
Ii + A)
Ii∑
i
Ii
− Ii = Ii
(
piLG − 1 + piLGA∑
i
Ii
)
. It is
immediate to check that Vi has the same sign as V =
∑
i
Vi = I
(
piLG− 1
)
+ piLGA. Observe also
that since the entrepreneur finds optimal to strategically default, then B(I + A) ≥ piHGA > A,
otherwise she would have not invested. We therefore have: V < I
(
piLG − 1
)
+ piLGA + B(I +
A)− A = (B + piLG− 1)(I + A) < 0. It follows that Vi < 0 for each i = 1, 2, ..., N .
2. Suppose next that (M1,M2, ...,MN) are menus of bilateral contracts. Let (Ii, Ri)i=1,2,...,N be
the array of entrepreneur’s optimal choices in each menu Mi in a given best response. By assump-
tion, (I, R) =
(∑
i
Ii,
∑
i
Ri
) ∈ L, which implies that U(I, R, L) ≥ U(I − Ii, R − Ri, L) for each
i = 1, 2, ..., N . To complete the proof, consider the case in which the entrepreneur’s best response
entails no strategic default. In this case, the former inequality is equivalent to
Ri
Ii
≤ B
piL
+G. The
profit to each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N is Vi = piLRi−Ii ≤ Ii(piL( B
piL
+G)−1) = Ii(piLG+B−1) <
0, where the last inequality follows from Ii ≥ 0, and from (1). 
The following lemma characterizes the entrepreneur’s optimal choices in the bilateral contract-
ing setting of Section 3.
Lemma 2 Consider the bilateral contracting game of Section 3 and assume that the entrepreneur
chooses e = H . Then, for each given menu Mi one has:
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1. If choosing (0, 0) in Mi is optimal for the entrepreneur, then each (Ii, Ri) ∈ Mi\(0, 0) is
such that pi ≥ G.
2. If each (Ii, Ri) ∈ Mi\(0, 0) is such that pi > G, then (0, 0) is the unique optimal choice in
Mi for the entrepreneur.
PROOF: Consider a given menu Mi, and let pi =
Ri
Ii
be the price of every contract (Ii, Ri) ∈
Mi\(0, 0). The entrepreneur’s marginal rate of substitution is equal to G when e = H .
1. Assume that (0, 0) is an entrepreneur’s optimal choice inMi . If there is a contract (Ii, Ri) ∈
Mi such that pi =
Ri
Ii
< G, then
U(
∑
j 6=i
Ij + Ii,
∑
j 6=i
Rj +Ri, H) = piH
(
G(
∑
j 6=i
Ij + Ii + A)− (
∑
j 6=i
Rj +Ri)
)+ − A
= U
(∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj, H
)
+ piH(GIi −Ri) > U
(∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj, H
)
,
for each (
∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj). This contradicts the assumption that (0, 0) is optimal in Mi.
2. Assume that each contract in Mi\(0, 0) is such that pi > G, and let (Ii, Ri) 6= (0, 0) be an
optimal choice in Mi. Then
U(
∑
j 6=i
Ij + Ii,
∑
j 6=i
Rj +Ri, H) = piH
(
G(
∑
j 6=i
Ij + Ii + A)− (
∑
j 6=i
Rj +Ri)
)+ − A
= U
(∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj, H
)
+ piH(GIi −Ri) < U
(∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj, H
)
,
for each (
∑
j 6=i
Ij,
∑
j 6=i
Rj). This contradicts the assumption that (Ii, Ri) is optimal in Mi. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 : We introduce the indirect utility functions
U¯−i(Ii, Ri, e) ≡ max
{
U
(
Ii +
∑
j 6=i
Ij, Ri +
∑
j 6=i
Rj, e
)
: (Ij, Rj) ∈Mj for all j 6= i
}
,
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . For a fixed profile of menus (M1,M2, ...,MN) and for a given effort e, the
function U¯−i(Ii, Ri, e) denotes the maximum payoff of the entrepreneur when she trades (Ii, Ri)
with investor i and optimally chooses one contract in each of the menus offered by his rivals. Thus,
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if (I∗, R∗) is an equilibrium allocation, we haveU(I∗, R∗, H) = U¯−i(I∗i , R
∗
i , H) for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Observe that each U¯−i function is continuous in (Ii, Ri) by Berge’s maximum theorem.
We now develop the proof, letting (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 , ...,M
∗
N) be the equilibrium menus. If (I
∗, R∗) ∈
Ψ, Proposition 1 is straightforward. Consider the case (I∗, R∗) 6∈ Ψ. If (I∗, R∗) 6= (0, 0) there
exists at least one investor i such that the entrepreneur chooses a contract (I∗i , R
∗
i ) 6= (0, 0) in
M∗i . It follows from Lemma 2 that
R∗i
I∗i
≤ G. Assume by contradiction that U(I∗, R∗, H) >
max
((Ii,Ri)∈Mi)i=1,...,N
U(I, R, L). Then, since max
((Ii,Ri)∈Mi)i=1,...,N
U(I, R, L) ≥ U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , L), we get
U(I∗, R∗, H) = U¯−i(I∗i , R
∗
i , H) > U¯−i(I
∗
i , R
∗
i , L). (7)
Suppose now that investor i deviates to the menu M εi = {(0, 0), (I∗i + ε, R∗i +
ε
piH
+ ε2)} with
ε > 0. Observe that
R∗i +
ε
piH
+ ε2
I∗i + ε
< max
{R∗i
I∗i
,
ε
piH
+ ε2
ε
} ≤ G for ε small. It follows from
Lemma 2 that the entrepreneur chooses (I∗i +ε, R
∗
i +
ε
piH
+ε2) in M εi . Moreover, given (7) and the
continuity of U¯−i, we have U¯−i(I∗i + ε, R
∗
i +
ε
piH
+ ε2, H) > U¯−i(I∗i + ε, R
∗
i +
ε
piH
+ ε2, L) which
guarantees that the entrepreneur chooses e = H at the deviation stage. Since piH(R∗i +
ε
piH
+ ε2)−
I∗i − ε > piHR∗i − I∗i the deviation is profitable, which contradicts the assumption that (I∗, R∗) is
an equilibrium aggregate allocation. If (I∗, R∗) = (0, 0), the same reasoning applies: letting any
investor i deviate to M εi = {(0, 0), (ε,
ε
piH
+ ε2)}, it is immediate to check that e = H is chosen
and that the deviation is profitable. In particular, the proof establishes the stronger result
∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N : U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , H) = U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , L) = max
((Ii,Ri)∈Mi)i=1,...,N
U(I, R, L). (8)

PROOF OF COROLLARY 1: Consider the equilibrium menus (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 , ...,M
∗
N). Let zji ∈ M∗j
be an optimal choice in M∗j , given that the entrepreneur has chosen (I
∗
i , R
∗
i ) in M
∗
i , and selects
e = L. In particular, we denote zii = (I∗i , R
∗
i ), and we let Zi =
∑
j
zji ∈ L be the corresponding
aggregate allocation. Consider now the vector dji =
(
zji − (I∗j , R∗j )
) ≡ (αji, βji). Given the
definition of Zi, we have Zi = (I∗, R∗) +
∑
j
dji. The system of equations in (8) can hence be
rewritten as
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∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N : U(I∗, R∗, H) = U(Zi, L) = U
(
(I∗, R∗) +
∑
j
dji, L
)
. (9)
Suppose, by contradiction, that (I∗, R∗) 6∈ Ψ. Then, for (9) to be satisfied, it should be that∑
j
dji ∈ R2++ for each i. Take any (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, .., N}2. See that each allocation Zj + dji =
Zj + (zji − (I∗j , R∗j )) is available: the entrepreneur can achieve it by trading zij in each menu M∗i ,
with i 6= j, and zji instead of (I∗j , R∗j ) in M∗j . In a similar way, each allocation Zi − dji can be
achieved by letting the entrepreneur trade the same contracts needed to obtain Zi, but choosing
(I∗j , R
∗
j ) instead of zji in M
∗
j . Condition (9) therefore implies that
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, .., N}2 : U(Zj + dji, L) ≤ U(Zj, L), (10)
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, .., N}2 : U(Zi − dji, L) ≤ U(Zi, L). (11)
We now show that, given (10) and (11), each dji vector is such that
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, .., N}2 : βji ≥ (G+ B
piL
)αji. (12)
To establish the result, it is useful to denote D = {(I, R) ∈ R2+ : R > G(I + A)}. Consider
any (i, j) pair. Suppose first that αji > 0. In this case, (10) implies that Zj 6∈ D and that βji ≥
(G+
B
piL
)αji, otherwise the payoff associated to Zj + dji would be greater than that corresponding
to Zj , and Zj would fail to be optimal. Suppose next that αji < 0. The same reasoning (starting
by considering Zj − dji) guarantees that (11) implies that Zi 6∈ D and that βji ≥ (G + B
piL
)αji.
Suppose finally that αji = 0. Then, by definition, zji = (I∗j , R
∗
j + βji) ∈ M∗j . Since (I∗j , R∗j ) is
optimal in M∗j , (10) implies that βji ≥ 0 at equilibrium. This in turn establishes (12).
Taking the sum of all the inequalities (12), we get
∑
j
βji ≥ (G+ B
piL
)
∑
j
αji. That is, the vector
∑
j
dji
has a slope greater than or equal to G +
B
piL
. It hence follows from (9) that if (I∗, R∗) 6∈ Ψ, then
for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, Zi ∈ D. Take now any i. Since
∑
j
dji ∈ R2++ whenever (I∗, R∗) 6∈ Ψ,
there exists an associated j such that αji > 0. Condition (10) then implies that Zj /∈ D, which
contradicts the assumption that for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} Zi ∈ D, and completes the proof. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
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Mild moral hazard : B ≤ piHG − 1. We show that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ
is supported at equilibrium by the following strategies. Investor 1 offers M∗1 = {(I∗, R∗), (0, 0)},
investor 2 offers M∗2 = {(I¯ , R¯), (0, 0)}. The investment level I¯ =
piL
∆pi
(I∗ + A) is such that
U(I∗, R∗, H) = U(I∗, R∗, L) = B(I∗ + I¯ + A)− A, (13)
and R¯ = G(I∗ + I¯ + A). Each other investor i = 3, 4, ..., N offers M∗i = {(0, 0)}.
Investing only I¯ is not an optimal choice for the entrepreneur. This is because, given (1), we
have
R¯
I¯
= G+
G∆pi
piL
> G+
B
piL
implying that, unless she defaults, the entrepreneur gets a payoff
smaller than the reservation one. Observe also that, given R¯, if I∗ + I¯ is invested the entrepreneur
defaults and gets a payoff B(I∗ + I¯ + A)− A. From (13), choosing (I∗, R∗) in M∗1 , (0, 0) in M∗2
and selecting e = H is an optimal choice for the entrepreneur. We now prove that no investor has
a unilateral profitable deviation.
Deviations of investor 1. Without loss of generality, any deviation by investor 1 can be repre-
sented by a menuM ′1 = {(I ′1, R′1), (0, 0)}. Given Lemma 1, any profitable deviation should induce
the entrepreneur to choose e = H . In this case, the deviation is profitable only if
piHR
′
1 − I ′1 > piHR∗ − I∗. (14)
Since (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ, (4) implies that (14) is satisfied only if I ′1 < I∗ and R′1 < R∗. We therefore
write (I ′1, R
′
1) = (I
∗ − ε, R∗ − ηε), with η ∈ (G − B
∆pi
,
1
piH
) and ε ∈ (0, GI
∗ −R∗
G− η ). The lower
bound on η ensures that, if she only trades the deviating contract, the entrepreneur selects e = H ,
while the upper bound ensures that (14) is satisfied. The upper bound on ε ensures that, if she only
trades the deviating contract, the entrepreneur’s payoff is above her reservation one. It follows
from Lemma 2 that when she chooses e = H , the entrepreneur selects (I ′1, R
′
1) in M
′
1, and (0, 0)
in M∗2 , since
R¯
I¯
> G. Given η and ε, choosing only (I ′1, R
′
1) optimally induces e = H . Once
again, when choosing e = L, she prefers not to invest rather than investing only I¯ . She therefore
strategically defaults, since piL
(
G(I ′ + I¯ +A)− (R′ + R¯)) < 0. Comparing her respective payoff
under e = H and e = L, one gets
piH(G(I
∗ − ε+ A)− (R∗ − η ε)) = B(I∗ + I¯ + A)− piH(G− η)ε < B(I∗ − ε+ I¯ + A),
30
where the last inequality obtains since the assumption of mild moral hazard together with η <
1
piH
and ε > 0 imply that B ≤ piH(G− 1/piH) < piH(G− η). Thus, the entrepreneur finds optimal to
default, contradicting the assumption that e = H is an optimal choice.
Deviations of investor 2. Let M ′2 = {(I ′2, R′2), (0, 0)} be a deviating menu of investor 2. Once
again, we restrict attention to deviations inducing the entrepreneur to choose e = H . In that case,
it follows from Lemma 2 that for (I ′2, R
′
2) to be traded by the entrepreneur, we must have
R′2
I ′2
≤ G.
Since (I∗, R∗) ∈ F , we also have R
∗
I∗
≤ G. It follows that
U(I∗ + I ′2, R
∗ +R′2, H) ≥ max{U(I ′2, R′2, H), U(I∗, R∗, H)}.
For (I ′2, R
′
2) to be a profitable deviation, it must be
R′2
I ′2
>
1
piH
. It then follows from (4) that
R′2
I ′2
> G − B
∆pi
and U(I∗ + I ′2, R
∗ + R′2, L) > U(I
∗ + I ′2, R
∗ + R′2, H). This implies that the
entrepreneur chooses e = L following the deviation to M ′2, which constitutes a contradiction. The
same reasoning yields that none of the inactive investors i = 3, ..., N has a unilateral deviation.
Strong moral hazard: B > piHG − 1. First, we show that no aggregate allocation different
from (Im, Rm) can be supported at equilibrium. Suppose that (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ \ {(Im, Rm)} is an
aggregate equilibrium allocation. There must hence be at least one traded contract, say (I∗i , R
∗
i ),
of price pi < G. We then show that investor i can profitably deviate to M ′i = {(0, 0), (I∗i − ε, R∗i −
ηε)}, with η ∈ (G − B
∆pi
,
1
piH
) and ε small enough. If the entrepreneur selects e = H , then, by
Lemma 1, the contract (I∗i −ε, R∗i −ηε) is chosen in the deviating menu. In that case, the deviation
is profitable by construction. The maximum payoff available at the deviation stage when e = H is
selected is
U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i − ηε,H) = ε piH(η −G) + U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , H),
and the maximum payoff available at the deviation stage if e = L is chosen is
U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i − ηε, L) =
 ε piL(η −G)−Bε+ U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , L) if no default,−Bε+ U¯−i(I∗i , R∗i , L) if default.
In case of no default, following (8), we have that U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i − ηε,H) > U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i −
ηε, L) ⇔ η − G − B
∆pi
> 0, which is satisfied by definition of strong moral hazard. Similarly, in
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case of default, U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i −ηε,H) > U¯−i(I∗i − ε, R∗i −ηε, L)⇔ piH(η−G) +B > 0, which
is satisfied by construction whenever B > piHG− 1. Thus, (I∗, R∗) ∈ Ψ \ {(Im, Rm)} cannot be
an equilibrium allocation.
Second, we show that (Im, Rm) is supported at equilibrium. Consider the following strate-
gies. Investor 1 offers M1 = {(Im, Rm), (0, 0)} and each other investor i = 2, ..., N offers
Mi = {(0, 0)}. Then, it is a best reply for the entrepreneur to select the contract (Im, Rm) in
M1 and to choose e = H . Since investor 1 earns the monopolistic profit, only deviations of the
inactive investors must be considered. The same reasoning developed for the deviations of investor
2 in the mild moral hazard case guarantees that no investor has a profitable deviation. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Take any (I∗, R∗) ∈ F such that I∗ ≥ Im and consider the follow-
ing profile of strategies. Each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N offersM∗ = {(0, 0); (I∗
N
,R∗(.)
)
;
( Iˆ
N
, Rˆ(.)
)},
with R∗(I) = G(I + A) for I /∈ {I∗, I
∗
N
}, and
R∗(I) =

R∗
N
if I = I∗,
R∗ − N − 1
N
GI∗ if I =
I∗
N
.
The investment level Iˆ is such that
U(I∗, R∗, H) = B(Iˆ + A)− A, (15)
which guarantees that Iˆ ≥ I∗ ≥ 0,31 and Rˆ(I) = G(I + A) ∀I ∈ R+. It is immediate to verify
that choosing the investment
I∗
N
in each menu and selecting e = H is an optimal choice for the
entrepreneur. Observe also that the repayment R∗(
I∗
N
) guarantees that the entrepreneur achieves
her equilibrium payoff by trading with only one investor. This is turn implies that U(I∗, R∗, H) is
available to the entrepreneur if any of the investors withdraws his offer. Consider now investors’
deviations. Without loss of generality, any unilateral deviation can be represented by a menu
M ′ = {(I∗
N
+ I ′,
R∗
N
+ R′(.)
)
, (0, 0)} with I ′ ∈
[
−I
∗
N
, Ic − I
∗
N
]
. Since piL = 0, it follows from
Lemma 1 that any profitable deviation necessarily induces e = H . We then have that
R′(I) >
1
piH
I ′, (16)
31As U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ B(I∗ +A)−A.
32
with I being the aggregate investment traded at the deviation stage. If, following the deviation, the
entrepreneur chooses e = L, then, as piL = 0, and given (15), she gets
Usd = U(I
∗, R∗, H) +B
(
I ′ +
I∗
N
− Iˆ
N
)
.
Consider the entrepreneur’s payoff when she chooses e = H . Assume first that several contracts
are traded at the deviation stage. Given equilibrium covenants, e = H is an optimal choice only
if the corresponding investment is I = I∗. The deviating contract should hence be such that
I ′ = k
I∗
N
, with k ∈ {1, ..., N − 2} and N − k − 1 being the number of non deviating lenders who
actively trade at the deviation stage.32 The corresponding entrepreneur’s payoff is
piH
(
G(I∗ + A)− N − k
N
R∗ −R′(I∗))+ − A < U(I∗, R∗, H) + k
N
(piHR
∗ − I∗),
where the inequality follows from (16). Observe that, since piHR∗ − I∗ = (piHG − 1)I∗ −
(U(I∗, R∗, H) − U(0)), the entrepreneur strategically defaults if k
N
(
U(I∗, R∗, H) − U(0)) +
B
N
(I∗ − Iˆ) ≥ k
N
(piHG− 1−B)I∗ or, equivalently, if
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0)− B
k
(Iˆ − I∗) ≥ (piHG− 1−B)I∗, (17)
which right-hand side is negative because I∗ ≥ 0, and B > piHG− 1.33 Since, for any (I∗, R∗) ∈
F , the left-hand side of (17) is increasing in k, and the right-hand side is decreasing in I∗, a
sufficient condition for the inequality to hold for all (k, I∗) is that it is satisfied for k = 1 when the
right-hand side equal to zero. That is, we have to check that
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0)−B(Iˆ − I∗) ≥ 0, (18)
which, given (15), is equivalent to B(I∗ + A)− A ≥ U(0)⇔ I∗ ≥ Im since piL = 0.
Suppose now that the entrepreneur only trades with the deviating investor, that is I =
I∗
N
+ I ′.
In this case, choosing e = H yields the payoff
piH
(
G(
I∗
N
+ I ′+A)− R
∗
N
−R′(I
∗
N
+ I ′)
)+−A < U(0)(N − 1) + U(I∗, R∗, H)
N
+ (piHG− 1)I ′.
32Observe that one cannot have N − 1 non deviating lenders who actively trade. In that case, I ′ is equal to zero and
the deviating lender who offers
I∗
N
cannot increase his profit since U(I∗, R∗, H) is available to the entrepreneur at the
deviation stage.
33The last inequality follows from (4) when piL = 0.
33
Since the entrepreneur’s equilibrium utility remains available at the deviation stage, the right-hand
side of the last inequality must a fortiori be strictly greater than U(I∗, R∗, H), which implies that
I ′ > 0. The entrepreneur therefore finds optimal to strategically default if
N − 1
N
(
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0))− B
N
(Iˆ − I∗) ≥ (piHG− 1−B)I ′. (19)
Since N ≥ 2, and because piHG− 1−B < 0 when piL = 0, any (I∗, R∗) which satisfies (18) also
satisfies (19). This implies that each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F such that I∗ ≥ Im is supported at equilibrium. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 4 and 5: See additional Appendix A.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: We design the schedules T1(.), ..., Tk(.), ..., TN(.), which identify
the transfers to be paid by investors if the project succeeds contingent on the array of investors’
participation decisions. Fix an arbitrary k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For each investor i 6= k, we let
Ti(I) =

1
piH
1− δ
N
I if I ∈ [0, Ic),
0 if I ≥ Ic,
(20)
with δ ∈ (0, 1−B), if all investors agree to participate. In addition, we let
Ti(I) =
 −ν if I ∈ [0, Ic),0 if I ≥ Ic, (21)
for some ν > 0, if investor i agrees to participate and at least one of the others does not. In this
case, investor i receives a positive reward. Finally, Ti(I) = 0 for all I ≥ 0 if investor i does not
participate. Consider then investor k. We have Tk(I) = 0 ∀I ≥ 0 if all remaining N − 1 investors
pay for the transfer, and Tk(I) = Kν ∀I ≥ 0 if only K of them decide to do so. In this last case,
investor k effectively rewards his competitors, which guarantees feasibility of the mechanism. The
subsidy to the entrepreneur is therefore
T (I) =

1
piH
N − 1
N
(1− δ)I if all investors participate,
0 if at least one investor does not participate.
(22)
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The proof is by contradiction. Consider any equilibrium allocation (I∗, R∗) 6= (Ic, Rc) supported
by investors’ menus M∗1 = ... = M
∗
N . In a symmetric equilibrium, (I
∗
i , R
∗
i ) = (
I∗
N
,
R∗
N
) for
each i and each investor earns the same profit. Thus, given that the transfer schedules are not
symmetric, no transfer is provided at equilibrium and we have U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ B(Iˆ + A) − A,
with Iˆ =
∑
i
Iˆi, and Iˆi =
Iˆ
N
being the highest investment level in M∗i . We show that, given the
schedules (T1(.), T2(.), ..., TN(.)), investor k has a profitable deviation. Suppose that he deviates
to the menu M ′k = ((0, 0), (I
′
k + ε, R
′
k(.))) with I
′
k = I
∗ − N − 1
N
piHR
∗ − I∗
piHG− 1 and ε > 0. The
function R′k(.) is such that
R′k(I) =

R∗
N
+
1
piH
(
I ′k −
I∗
N
+ ε
)
+ ε2 if I = I ′k + ε,
G(I + A) if I 6= I ′k + ε.
For ε = 0, the pair (I ′k + ε, R
′
k(I
′
k + ε)) is such that U(I
′
k, R
′
k(I
′
k), H) = U(I
∗, R∗, H) and
piHR
′
k(I
′
k) − I ′k = piH
R∗
N
− I
∗
N
. That is, (I ′k + ε, R
′
k(I
′
k + ε)) lies at the intersection of the en-
trepreneur’s equilibrium indifference curve with the investor k’s equilibrium isoprofit line. In
addition, since (I∗, R∗) 6= (Ic, Rc), (I ′k + ε, R′k(I ′k + ε)) ∈ int(F) for ε small enough. The devi-
ation is designed to induce the entrepreneur to trade (I ′k + ε, R
′
k(I
′
k + ε)) and to choose e = H .
It is immediate to see that, given M ′k, if the entrepreneur chooses e = H , she can get a payoff
above the equilibrium one by choosing (I ′k + ε, R
′
k(I
′
k + ε)). In this case, however, given R
′
k(.),
she finds optimal to trade with investor k alone. It follows that, as long as ε > 0, M ′k is a profitable
deviation for investor k whenever e = H is chosen. We now show that if investors agree to finance
the subsidy to the entrepreneur, she strictly prefers to choose e = H following this deviation. This
is indeed the case if
U(I∗, R∗, H) + (piHG− 1− ε)ε+ N − 1
N
(1− δ)(I ′k + ε) > B(Iˆ + A)− A+B
(
I ′k + ε−
Iˆ
N
)
,
where the left-hand side is equal to U(I ′k + ε, R
′
k(I
′
k + ε), H). Choose ε small enough to ensure
(piHG− 1− ε) > 0; since I
′
k
N
≤ I
∗
N
≤ Iˆ
N
, a sufficient condition to verify the above inequality is
U(I∗, R∗, H)− (B(Iˆ + A)− A) + N − 1
N
(1− δ)I ′k > B
N − 1
N
I ′k,
which is satisfied because U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ B(Iˆ + A)− A, and δ < 1−B.
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Consider then the investors’ participation subgame. Given (20) and (21), it is a dominant
strategy for each nondeviating investor i 6= k to pay for the transfer. In particular, paying is an
optimal choice when investor i anticipates that all other investors pay if
1− δ
N
(I ′k + ε) <
Iˆ
N
which, given that Iˆ > 0, δ < 1, and I ′k ≤ I∗ ≤ Iˆ , is satisfied for ε sufficiently small. It follows that
providing the subsidy to the entrepreneur is the unique equilibrium outcome of the continuation
game. This in turn guarantees that M ′k induces the entrepreneur to choose e = H , and constitutes
a profitable deviation for investor k.
To complete the proof, see that given the schedules (T1(.), T2(.), ..., TN(.)), there exists a profile
of symmetric menus (M∗1 , ...,M
∗
N) which supports (I
c, Rc) as an equilibrium allocation. This
follows straightforwardly from the fact that T (I) = 0 for I ≥ Ic and that (Ic, Rc) can be supported
at equilibrium with the symmetric strategies exhibited in Proposition 3.
The proof extends to the case in which investors can write covenants contingent on the initial
debt I0 (see additional Appendix A). 
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ADDITIONAL APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Define
γ ≡ max{ G
B(G− B
∆pi
)
,
G
(piHG− 1)(G− B
∆pi
)
,
(
piHG−B
B
)2
1
piH(G− B
∆pi
)
}
> 0,
and
UN = UB +
2γ√
N − 1(U(I
c, Rc, H)− UB) with UB = max{U(0), U(Ic, Rc, H)−BIc}.
Let us consider a number of investors N satisfying N > N = (2γ + 1)2. Observe that UN <
U(Ic, Rc, H) for any N > N . Note also that, when B > piHG − 1, we have UB = U(0) so that
lim
N−→∞
UN = U(0) as stated in Proposition 4.
We exhibit a profile of investors’ strategies that supports any allocation (I∗, R∗) satisfying (6) at
equilibrium. Each investor i = {1, 2, ..., K}, with K ≡ b√Nc, offers M∗i = {(0, 0);
(I∗
K
,R∗i (.)
)},
with R∗i (I) = G(I + A) for I /∈ {I∗,
I∗
K
}, and
R∗i (I
∗) =
R∗
K
,
R∗i (
I∗
K
) = (R∗ − K − 1
K
GI∗).
Each investor j = {K + 1, ..., N} offers M∗j = {(0, 0);
( I¯
N −K , R¯j(.)
)} with R¯j(I) = G(I +
A) ∀I ∈ R+. The investment level I¯ is such that
U(I∗, R∗, H) = B(I∗ + I¯ + A)− A. (A.1)
Choosing
I∗
K
in each menu and selecting e = H is an optimal choice for the entrepreneur. Observe
also that the repayment R∗i (
I∗
K
) guarantees that U(I∗, R∗, H) is available to the entrepreneur if any
of the investors withdraws his offer.
Now consider the investors’ deviations. We first remark that every profitable deviation must
induce the entrepreneur to choose e = H . Given Lemma 1, a single investor may achieve a positive
profit by inducing e = L only if the entrepreneur trades several contracts out of equilibrium and
does not default. Given the equilibrium covenants, this is possible only if she takes up an aggregate
loan of I∗ and chooses e = L, which yields the entrepreneur a payoff smaller than the available
equilibrium one, and cannot be an optimal choice.
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We next show that there are not unilaterally profitable deviations for investors, which sustains
the allocation (I∗, R∗) at equilibrium. In particular, a deviation of investor i ∈ {1, · · · , K} can be
characterized, without loss of generality, by the menu M ′i = {
(I∗
K
+ I ′i,
R∗
K
+R′i(.)
)
, (0, 0)}, with
I ′i ∈
[
−I
∗
K
, Ic − I
∗
K
]
. Similarly, a deviation of any investor j ∈ {K + 1, · · · , N} can be charac-
terized by the menu M ′j = {
( I¯
N −K + I
′
j, R
′
j(.)
)
, (0, 0)}, with I ′j ∈
[
− I¯
N −K , I
c − I¯
N −K
]
.
Observe that for any such deviation to be profitable when the entrepreneur chooses the aggregate
investment I and the effort e = H , one needs that
R′i(I) >
1
piH
I ′i, R
′
j(I) >
1
piH
(
I ′j +
I¯
N −K
)
, (A.2)
for i ∈ {1, · · · , K}, j ∈ {K + 1, · · · , N}. If, following any such deviation, the entrepreneur
defaults, her payoff is
Usd = U(I
∗, R∗, H) +BI ′h,
with h = i, j. We now evaluate the entrepreneur’s payoff when e = H is chosen.
First, consider a deviation of an active investor i. If the entrepreneur only trades with investor
i at the deviation stage, her payoff is
piH
(
G(
I∗
K
+I ′i+A)−
R∗
K
−R′i(I ′i+
I∗
K
)
)+−A < K − 1
K
U(0)+
U(I∗, R∗, H)
K
+I ′i(piHG−1), (A.3)
where the inequality follows from (A.2). Since the equilibrium utility is available at the deviation
stage, the right-hand side of (A.3) must be strictly larger than U(I∗, R∗, H), which implies that
I ′i > 0. Thus, if Usd is greater than the right-hand side of (A.3), the entrepreneur finds it optimal to
strategically default. This is the case whenever
K − 1
K
(
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0)) ≥ (piHG− 1−B)I ′i. (A.4)
We show that each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying (6) also satisfies (A.4). We consider two cases:
1. If B > piHG − 1, then since the right-hand side of (A.4) is negative for each I ′i > 0, (A.4) is
satisfied by any (I∗, R∗) ∈ F .
2. If B ≤ piHG− 1, a sufficient condition for (A.4) to hold is
U(I∗, R∗, H)− UB ≥ 1
K − 1(UB − U(0)), (A.5)
in which I ′i is replaced by I
c in (A.4). Note that, as K − 1 ≥ √N − 1, we have that 2√
N − 1 ≥
1
K − 1 . Moreover, as
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γ ≥ G
B(G− B
∆pi
)
>
piHG
B
>
piHG− 1−B
B
=
UB − U(0)
U(Ic, Rc, H)− UB ,
condition (6) implies (A.5) thus the result.
If several contracts are traded at the deviation stage, then, given the equilibrium covenants,
e = H is an optimal choice only if the aggregate investment is I∗. In this case, we necessarily have
I ′i = k
I∗
K
, with k ∈ {1, ..., K − 2}. The entrepreneur’s payoff when e = H is chosen is then
piH
(
G(I∗+A)− [K − (k + 1)] + 1
K
R∗−R′i(I∗)
)−A < U(I∗, R∗, H) + k
K
(piHR
∗− I∗), (A.6)
where the inequality follows from (A.2). The entrepreneur strategically defaults if Usd is greater
than the value in the right-hand side of (A.6) which, since piHR∗−I∗ = (piHG−1)I∗−(U(I∗, R∗, H)−
U(0)), yields
k
K
(
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0)) ≥ k
K
(piHG− 1−B)I∗. (A.7)
Since each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying (6) is such that U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ UB, any of these allocations
also satisfies (A.7).
Suppose now that an inactive investor j deviates. If the entrepreneur only trades with investor
j at the deviation stage, given (A.2), her payoff when e = H is chosen is bounded above by
U(0) + (piHG−1)
( I¯
N −K + I
′
j
)
. The entrepreneur finds therefore optimal to strategically default
if
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ I ′j(piHG− 1−B) +
I¯
N −K (piHG− 1). (A.8)
From (A.1), we get
BI¯ ≤ (piHG− 1−B)I∗ + U(0) + (1−B)A. (A.9)
Given (A.9), a sufficient condition for (A.8) is then
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥(piHG− 1−B)I ′j
+
1
N −K
piHG− 1
B
(
U(0) + (1−B)A+ (piHG− 1−B)I∗
)
.
(A.10)
We show that each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying (6) also satisfies (A.10). We consider two cases:
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1. If B > piHG−1, we remark that the inequality U(I∗, R∗, H)−U(0) ≥ (− I¯
N −K )(piHG−1−
B) +
I¯
N −K (piHG− 1) = B
I¯
N −K is weaker than (A.8). Indeed, we obtain the right-hand side
by replacing in (A.8) I ′j by its lower bound −
I¯
N −K . Given (A.9), and since piHG− 1− B < 0,
(A.8) is a fortiori weaker than U(I∗, R∗, H) − U(0) ≥ 1
N −K (U(0) + (1−B)A), which in
turn implies (A.10). To show that this inequality holds for each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F , observe that,
since N ≥ 3 by construction, we get 2√
N − 1 ≥
1
N −√N − 1 ≥
1
N −K . In addition, using
piHG− 1 < B < 1 we have
γ ≥ G
(piHG− 1)(G− B
∆pi
)
>
(piHG−B)
(
1
piH
− (G− B
∆pi
)
)
(piHG− 1)(G− B
∆pi
)
=
(piHG−B)A
(piHG− 1)Ic =
U(0) + (1−B)A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− U(0) .
Condition (6) implies then that
U(I∗, R∗, H)−U(0) ≥ 1
N −K
U(0) + (1−B)A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− U(0)(U(I
c, Rc, H)−U(0)) = 1
N −K (U(0)+(1−B)A),
thus the result.
2. If B ≤ piHG− 1, replacing I ′j and I∗ by Ic, a sufficient condition for (A.10) is
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ (UB − U(0)) + 1
N −K
piHG− 1
B
(
UB+(1−B)A
)
.
As in the former case,
2√
N − 1 ≥
1
N −K . Moreover,
γ ≥
(
piHG−B
B
)2
1
piH(G− B
∆pi
)
≥
(
piHG− 1
B
)(
piHG−B
B
)1 +
1
piH
− (G− B
∆pi
)
(G− B
∆pi
)

≥
(
piHG− 1
B
)(
piHG−B − 1
B
+
piHG−B
B
A
Ic
)
≥ piHG− 1
B
(piHG− 1−B)Ic + A(piHG−B)
BIc
=
piHG− 1
B
UB + (1−B)A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− UB . (A.11)
Then, (6) implies that
U(I∗, R∗, H)− UB ≥ 1
N −K
piHG− 1
B
UB + (1−B)A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− UB (U(I
c, Rc, H)− UB),
thus the result.
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If several contracts are traded at the deviation stage, then, given the equilibrium covenants,
e = H is an optimal choice only if the aggregate investment is I∗. In this case, we necessarily have
I ′j = k
I∗
K
− I¯
N −K , with k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}. The entrepreneur’s payoff when e = H is chosen is
then
piH
(
G(I∗ + A)− K − k
K
R∗ −R′j(I∗)
)− A ≤ U(I∗, R∗, H) + k
K
(piHR
∗ − I∗), (A.12)
where the inequality follows from (A.2). The entrepreneur finds optimal to strategically default if
Usd is greater than the value in the right-hand side of (A.12), which is the case if
B
( k
K
I∗ − I¯
N −K
) ≥ k
K
(piHR
∗ − I∗).
Using (A.9) and piHR∗ − I∗ = (piHG − 1)I∗ − (U(I∗, R∗, H) − U(0)), a sufficient condition for
(A.12) is
k
K
(
(1+B−piHG)I∗+U(I∗, R∗, H)−U(0)
) ≥ 1
N −K ((piHG− 1−B)I
∗ + U(0) + (1−B)A) .
(A.13)
The left-hand side of (A.13) is increasing in k. This is straightforward ifB > piHG−1. In the case
B ≤ piHG− 1, the result follows from U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ UB − U(0) = (piHG− 1− B)Ic
and (Ic − I∗) ≥ 0. It is hence enough to verify (A.13) for k = 1, that is,
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ K
N −K (U(0)+(1−B)A) +
N
N −K (piHG− 1−B)I
∗. (A.14)
We show that each (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying (6) also satisfies (A.14). We consider two cases:
1. If B > piHG− 1, we show that U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ K
N −K (U(0) + A), which is stronger
than (A.14), is satisfied. Note that (
√
N − 1)2 ≥ 0, or equivalently, 2N − 2√N ≥ N − 1. This
implies that
2√
N − 1 ≥
√
N + 1
N −√N ≥
K
N −K . In addition,
γ ≥ G
(piHG− 1)(G− B
∆pi
)
=
piHG
piHG− 1
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
≥ piHG
piHG− 1
A
Ic
=
U(0) + A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− U(0) .
To conclude, observe that (6) implies
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ K
N −K
U(0) + A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− U(0)(U(I
c, Rc, H)− U(0)).
2. If B ≤ piHG− 1, we remark that
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KN −K (U(0)+(1−B)A) +N(piHG− 1−B)I
∗
≤ K
N −K (U(0) + (1−B)A) +N(UB − U(0)) = UB − U(0) +
K
N −K (UB + (1−B)A) .
We show that U(I∗, R∗, H)− UB ≥ K
N −K (UB + (1−B)A), which is stronger than (A.14). As
in the former case, we have
2√
N − 1 ≥
K
N −K . Then, using (A.11), condition (6) implies that
U(I∗, R∗, H)−UB ≥ K
N −K
UB + (1−B)A
U(Ic, Rc, H)− UB (U(I
c, Rc, H)−UB) = K
N −K (UB+(1−B)A).
Thus, any allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying (6) also satisfies (A.4), (A.7), (A.10), and (A.14). This
proves that any such allocation is supported at equilibrium by the investors’ strategies M∗1 , ...,M
∗
N .

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: We extend the results of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 to the case
in which covenants can be contingent on the initial debt I0. Assume piL = 0, take any (I∗, R∗) ∈ F
such that I∗ ≥ Im and consider the following profile of strategies. Each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N
offers the same menu M∗ = {(0, 0, 0, 0), (I∗
N
,R∗(.), I+(.), R+(.)
)
,
(
0, 0, Iˆ+(.), Rˆ+(.)
)}. We shall
refer to (0, 0, 0, 0) as the null contract, to (
I∗
N
,R∗(.), I+(.), R+(.)) as the equilibrium contract, and
to (0, 0, Iˆ+(.), Rˆ+(.)) as the latent contract. In each equilibrium contract, R∗(.) is such that
R∗(I0, IF (I0)) =

R∗ − N − 1
N
GI∗ if I0 = IF (I0) =
I∗
N
,
R∗
N
otherwise,
where IF (I0) is the amount ultimately invested for a given initial I0. The additional offer (I+(.), R+(.))
is such that
I+(I0) =
 0 if I0 = k
I∗
N
, for k = 1, 2, ..., N,
ICL otherwise,
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R+(I0, I
F (I0)) =

0 if I0 = IF (I0) = I∗, or I0 = IF (I0) =
I∗
N
,
G(IF (I0) + A) if I0 = I∗, IF (I0) 6= I∗, or I0 = I
∗
N
, IF (I0) 6= I
∗
N
,
p∗ICL otherwise,
with p∗ =
R∗
I∗
. The investment ICL is the additional credit line which any investor stands ready to
provide against any competitors’ threat of asking for an accelerated repayment. It is such that
U(
I∗
N
+ ICL, p∗(
I∗
N
+ ICL), L) = U(Ic, Rc, H).
In each latent contract, the additional offer (Iˆ+(.), Rˆ+(.)) is such that
Iˆ+(I0) =

Iˆ
N
if I0 = 0,
1
N − 1(Iˆ −
I∗
N
) if I0 =
I∗
N
,
0 otherwise,
and Rˆ+(I0, IF (I0)) = G(IF (I0) + A) for all I0 and IF (I0). As in the proof of Proposition 3, the
investment Iˆ is characterized by U(I∗, R∗, H) = B(Iˆ + A)− A.
Given these offers, the entrepreneur cannot obtain a payoff higher than U(I∗, R∗, H). At equi-
librium, she achieves U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading the same equilibrium contract with each of the
investors, receiving thereby no additional funds at the second stage, and selecting e = H . As in
the proof of Proposition 3, none of the investors is indispensable to provide the equilibrium payoff:
the entrepreneur can get U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading the equilibrium contract with only one investor.34
Consider then investors’ deviations. Without loss of generality, any unilateral deviation can
be represented by a menu M ′ = {(0, 0, 0, 0), (I ′, R′(.), I ′+(.), R′+(.))}. By Lemma 1, and given
that piL = 0, each profitable deviation must induce the entrepreneur to choose e = H . Hence, it
must be that I ′ ∈ {0, I
∗
N
} in any profitable deviation. Indeed, if I ′ 6∈ {0, I
∗
N
}, the entrepreneur
can combine the deviating contract with (at least) one equilibrium contract, and obtain the line of
credit (ICL, p∗ICL). This guarantees her (at least) the payoff U(
I∗
N
+ ICL, p∗(
I∗
N
+ ICL), L) =
U(Ic, Rc, H). The entrepreneur’s strategy can therefore be constructed so that she strategically
defaults when trading I ′ with the deviating investor. In addition, if the entrepreneur chooses e = H ,
then the aggregate initial financing induced by the deviation to M ′ must be I0 ∈ {0, I
∗
N
, I∗}.
34Alternatively, she can also get U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading all latent contracts and defaulting.
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Indeed, the repayment R+(.) is such that, if she trades any equilibrium contract together with the
deviating one, the entrepreneur strategically defaults unless her initial outside financing is
I∗
N
or
I∗.35
Assuming that e = H is chosen, we distinguish two cases, depending on whether the borrower
trades at least one of the equilibrium contracts, or she only trades with the deviating investor. In
the first case, given R+(.), it must be that I0 = IF (I0) ≤ I∗ and I ′+(I0) = I+(I0) = 0, otherwise
she would default. It follows that, since I ′ ∈ {0, I
∗
N
}, we must have I ′ = I
∗
N
for the deviation to
be profitable. Thus, the corresponding entrepreneur’s payoff is
piH(G(
I∗
N
+ k
I∗
N
+ A)−R′(I0, IF (I0))−R′+(I0, IF (I0))− kR
∗
N
)− A
< piHG(I
∗ + A)− I ′ + I
∗
N
− piHR∗ − A = U(I∗, R∗, H) + (I
∗
N
− I ′),
(A.15)
where k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} is any number of equilibrium contracts optimally traded by the en-
trepreneur when e = H . The latter inequality obtains since piH
(
R′(I0, IF ) + R′+(I0, IF )
)− I ′ >
(piH
R∗
N
− I
∗
N
), which guarantees that the deviation is profitable, and by observing thatG
I∗
N
−R
∗
N
>
0 by construction. Thus, (A.15) implies that, following the deviation, the payoff achieved by the
entrepreneur when choosing e = H is strictly below U(I∗, R∗, H), which contradicts the fact that
no investor is indispensable to provide the equilibrium payoff under e = H .
We next consider the case in which, when choosing e = H , the entrepreneur only trades with
the deviating investor, which implies that I0 = I ′ ∈ {0, I
∗
N
}. Her corresponding payoff is
piH
(
G(I ′ + I ′+(I ′) + A)−R′(I ′, IF (I ′))−R′+(I ′, IF (I ′)))− A
< piH(G(I
′ + A)− R
∗
N
)− A+ (piHG− 1)I ′+(I ′) + (I
∗
N
− I ′) (A.16)
< U(I∗, R∗, H) + (piHG− 1)I ′+(I ′). (A.17)
Inequality (A.16) follows from
piH(R
′(I ′, IF (I ′) +R′+(I ′, IF (I ′)) > I ′ + I ′+(I ′) + (piH
R∗
N
− I
∗
N
),
which guarantees that the deviation is profitable. Inequality (A.17) obtains because I ′ ≤ I
∗
N
and
piHG − 1 > 0. Since U(I∗, R∗, H) is available to the entrepreneur at the deviation stage, (A.17)
implies that I ′+(I ′) > 0. We now prove that, by strategically defaulting, the entrepreneur gets
35Rˆ+(.) is such that trading any of the latent contracts straightforwardly leads to strategic default.
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a payoff which is above the upper bound in (A.16). Suppose that, together with the deviating
contract, she takes N − 1 latent contracts at the deviation stage. Given Rˆ+(.), she then finds
optimal to default. Her corresponding payoff is
Usd = B(I
′ + I ′+(I ′) + (N − 1)I¯+(I ′) + A)− A. (A.18)
If I0 = I ′ =
I∗
N
, (A.18) yieldsUsd = U(I∗, R∗, H)+BI ′+(I ′) > U(I∗, R∗, H)+(piHG−1)I ′+(I ′),
as I ′+(I ′) > 0, and B > piHG− 1 since piL = 0. If I0 = I ′ = 0, (A.16) together with the fact that
U(I∗, R∗, H) remains available at the deviation stage imply piH(G(I ′+(0)+A)−I ′+(0)−(piHR
∗
N
−
I∗
N
) > U∗(I∗, R∗, H). Since U∗(I∗, R∗, H)−U(0) = (piHG−1)I∗−(piHR∗−I∗), we get I ′+(0) >
I∗. Thus, without loss of generality, we can write I ′+(0) =
I∗
N
+ I
′′ with I ′′ >
N − 1
N
I∗ > 0.
Then, (A.16) implies that the entrepreneur’s payoff is bounded by
U(0)(N − 1) + U(I∗, R∗, H)
N
+
(piHG− 1)I ′′ , and (A.18) can be rewritten as
Usd = B
(N − 1
N
Iˆ +
I∗
N
+ I
′′
+ A
)− A = U(I∗, R∗, H) +B(I ′′ + I∗
N
− Iˆ
N
).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, we have Usd ≥ U(0)(N − 1) + U(I
∗, R∗, H)
N
+ (piHG−
1)I
′′ for each I ′′ > 0. This guarantees that the entrepreneur strategically defaults and reestablishes
that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying I∗ ≥ Im is sustained at equilibrium.
We now extend the result of Proposition 4. We exhibit a profile of investors’ strategies that
supports at equilibrium any allocation (I∗, R∗) satisfying (6). Each investor i = {1, 2, ..., K}, with
K ≡ b√Nc, offers
M∗i = {(0, 0, 0, 0);
(I∗
K
,R∗i (.), I
+
i (.), R
+
i (.)
)
,
(
0, 0, I¯+i (.), R¯
+
i (.))},
and each investor j = {K + 1, ..., N} offers
M∗j = {(0, 0, 0, 0);
( I¯
N −K , R¯j(.), 0, 0
)
;
(
0, 0, I˜+j (.), R˜
+
j (.)
)}.
We shall refer to (0, 0, 0, 0) as the null contract, to (
I∗
K
,R∗i (.), I
+
i (.), R
+
i (.)) as the equilibrium
contract, to (
I¯
N −K , R¯j(.), 0, 0) as the type-1 latent contract, to (0, 0, I¯
+
i (.), R¯
+
i (.)) as the type-2
latent contract, and, to (0, 0, I˜+j (.), R˜
+
j (.)) as the type-3 latent contract.
In each equilibrium contract, R∗i (.) is such that
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
R∗i (I0) = (R
∗ − K − 1
K
GI∗) if I0 = IF (I0) =
I∗
K
,
R∗i (I0) =
R∗
K
, otherwise.
The additional offer (I+i (.), R
+
i (.)) is such that:
I+i (I0) =
 0 if I0 = k
I∗
K
+ l
I¯
N −K , for k = 1, 2, ..., K and l = 0, ..., N −K,
ICL otherwise,
and
R+i (I0, I
F (I0)) =

0 if I0 = I∗, IF (I0) = I∗, or I0 =
I∗
K
, IF (I0) =
I∗
K
,
G(IF (I0) + A) if I0 = I∗, IF (I0) 6= I∗, or I0 = I
∗
K
, IF (I0) 6= I
∗
K
,
or I0 = k
I∗
K
+ l
I¯
N −K , ∀I
F (I0)
for k = 1, 2, ..., K and l = 0, ..., N −K,with (k, l) /∈ {(K, 0), (1, 0)},
G(ICL + A) otherwise,
where ICL is such that B(
I∗
K
+ ICL + A)− A = U(Ic, Rc, H) and I¯ is such that U(I∗, R∗, H) =
B(I∗ + I¯ + A)− A. The additional offer (I¯+i (.), R¯+i (.)) is such that
I¯+i (I0) =

I∗
K
if I0 = 0 or, I0 =
I∗
K
or, I0 =
I¯
N −K ,
0 otherwise,
and R¯+i (I0, I
F (I0)) = G(I
F (I0) + A) for all I0 and IF (I0).
For any j ∈ {K + 1, 2, ..., N}, the repayment R¯j(.) satisfies R¯+j (I0, IF (I0)) = G(IF (I0) +A)
for all I0 and IF (I0) and the offers (I˜+j (.), R˜
+
j (.)) are such that
I˜+j (I0) =

I¯
N −K if I0 =
I∗
K
or, I0 = 0,
0 otherwise,
and R˜+j (I0, I
F (I0)) = G(I
F (I0) + A) for all I0 and IF (I0).
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Given these offers, the entrepreneur cannot obtain a payoff higher than U(I∗, R∗, H). At
equilibrium, she achieves U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading the equilibrium contract with each lender i ∈
{1, 2, ..., K}, the null contract with each lender j ∈ {K + 1, 2, ..., N}, obtains no additional funds
in the second stage and selects e = H . As before, none of the investors is indispensable: the
entrepreneur can get U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading the equilibrium contract with only one investor.36
Consider then investors’ deviations. Without loss of generality, a deviation by any investor can
be represented by a menuM ′ = {(0, 0, 0, 0), (I ′, R′(.), I ′+(.), R′+(.))}. Every profitable deviation
must induce the entrepreneur to choose e = H . Indeed, given Lemma 1, a single investor may
achieve a positive profit by inducing e = L only if the entrepreneur trades several contracts out
of equilibrium and does not default. Given the equilibrium contracts, this is possible only if she
takes up an aggregate initial financing I0 = I∗, invests ultimately IF (I∗) = I∗ and chooses e = L,
which yields the entrepreneur a payoff smaller than the available equilibrium one, and thus cannot
be an optimal choice.
Suppose an investor i ∈ {1, ..., K} deviates. Any profitable deviation must be such that I ′ ∈
{0, I
∗
K
}. Indeed, if I ′ 6∈ {0, I
∗
K
}, then the entrepreneur can combine the deviating contract with
(at least) one equilibrium contract, and get access to the line of credit (ICL, G(ICL + A)). which
ensures her a payoff at least equal to B(
I∗
K
+ ICL + A) − A = U(Ic, Rc, H). This shows that
in any profitable deviation the borrower defaults, which constitutes a contradiction. In addition,
at the deviation stage, the initial investment I0 belongs to the set {0, I
∗
K
, I∗}. Indeed, R+i (.) is
such that, if she trades any equilibrium contract together with the deviating one, the entrepreneur
necessarily defaults if I0 /∈ {I
∗
K
, I∗}. Assuming that e = H is chosen, we distinguish below two
cases, depending on whether the entrepreneur trades at least one of the equilibrium contracts, or
she only trades with the deviating investor.
Consider that the entrepreneur trades equilibrium contracts at the deviation stage. GivenR+i (.),
we have I0 = IF (I0) which implies I ′+(I0) = I+(I0) = 0, otherwise the entrepreneur would
default. It follows that, since I ′ ∈ {0, I
∗
K
}, it must be that I ′ = I
∗
K
for the deviation to be profitable.
Thus, the entrepreneur’s payoff is
piH(G(
I∗
K
+ k
I∗
K
+A)−R′(I0, IF (I0))−R′+(I0, IF (I0))− kR
∗
K
)−A < U(I∗, R∗, H), (A.19)
where k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} is any number of equilibrium contracts optimally traded by the en-
trepreneur when e = H . The latter inequality obtains since piH
(
R′(I0, IF ) +R′+(I0, IF )
)− I∗
K
>
36She may also get U(I∗, R∗, H) by trading the type-1 latent contract with each investor j ∈ {K + 1, 2, ..., N}.
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(piH
R∗
K
− I
∗
K
), which guarantees that the deviation is profitable, and by observing thatG
I∗
K
−R
∗
K
>
0 by construction. Thus, (A.19) implies that, following the deviation, the payoff achieved by the
entrepreneur when choosing e = H is strictly below U(I∗, R∗, H), which contradicts the fact that
no investor is indispensable to provide the equilibrium payoff under e = H .
Consider the case where the entrepreneur trades the null contract with all non deviating lenders.
This implies that I0 = I ′ ∈ {0, I
∗
K
} and her payoff is
piH
(
G(I ′ + I ′+(I ′) + A)−R′(I ′, IF (I ′))−R′+(I ′, IF (I ′)))− A
< piH(G(I
′ + A)− R
∗
K
)− A+ (piHG− 1)I ′+(I ′) + (I
∗
K
− I ′) (A.20)
< U(I∗, R∗, H) + (piHG− 1)I ′+(I ′), (A.21)
where (A.20) obtains since
piH(R
′(I ′, IF (I ′)) +R′+(I ′, IF (I ′)) > I ′ + I ′+(I ′) + (piH
R∗
K
− I
∗
K
) (A.22)
for the deviation to be profitable. The second one obtains because I ′ ≤ I
∗
K
and piHG−1 > 0. Since
the payoff U(I∗, R∗, H) is available to the entrepreneur at the deviation stage, (A.21) implies that
I ′+(
I∗
K
) > 0.
We prove that the upper-bound (A.20) of the entrepreneur’s payoff is less than what she gets
if she strategically defaults. Indeed, if, following the deviation, the entrepreneur strategically de-
faults, she can select the contract
(
0, 0, I¯+i (.), R¯
+
i (.)
)
in the menu of each non-deviating investor
i ∈ {1, ..., K} and the contract (0, 0, I˜+j (.), R˜+j (.)) in the menu of each lender j ∈ {K+ 1, ..., N}.
By doing that, she obtains
Usd = B
(
I ′ + I ′+(I ′) + (K − 1)I¯+i (I ′) + (N −K)I˜+j (I ′) + A)
)− A. (A.23)
If I ′ =
I∗
K
, then Usd = U(I∗, R∗, H)+BI ′+(
I∗
K
). Thus, using (A.21), a sufficient condition for the
entrepreneur to strategically default is
K − 1
K
(U(I∗, R∗, H) − U(0)) ≥ (piHG − 1 − B)I ′+(I
∗
K
).
This corresponds to (A.4), which holds from the proof of Proposition 4. If I ′ = 0, we deduce from
(A.22) that
piH(R
′(0, IF (0)) +R′+(0, IF (0))) > I ′+(0) + (piH
R∗
K
− I
∗
K
), (A.24)
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from which it follows that I ′+(0) > I∗. Thus, without loss of generality, we write I ′+(0) =
I∗
K
+I
′′
with I ′′ >
K − 1
K
I∗ > 0. Then, using again (A.20) and (A.24), we get an upper bound for the
entrepreneur’s payoff:
piH
(
G(I ′+(0)+A)−R′(0, IF (0))−R′+(0, IF (0)))−A < U(0)(K − 1) + U(I∗, R∗, H)
K
+(piHG−1)I ′′ .
But (A.23) becomesUsd = B
(K − 1
K
I∗+
I∗
K
+I
′′
+I¯+A
)−A = U(I∗, R∗, H)+BI ′′ . Thus, a suffi-
cient condition for the entrepreneur to default is
K − 1
K
(U(I∗, R∗, H)−U(0)) ≥ (piHG−1−B)I ′′
with I ′′ > 0. Again, we have established this relation in the proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose an investor j ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} deviates. Any profitable deviation must be such that
I ′ ∈ {0, I¯
N −K }. Indeed, if I
′ 6∈ {0, I¯
N −K }, then the entrepreneur can combine equilibrium
contracts and/or latent contracts of type-1, get access to the line of credit, and earn at least the
payoff B(
I∗
K
+ ICL + A) − A = U(Ic, Rc, H). This shows that, in any profitable deviation,
the entrepreneur defaults, which constitutes a contradiction. Below, we consider the two cases
I ′ =
I¯
N −K and I
′ = 0 and we show that in each case the entrepreneur strategically defaults
following the deviation.
First, consider the case I ′ =
I¯
N −K . Because e = H is chosen at the deviation stage, the
entrepreneur does not trade latent contracts. Furthermore, given the additional offers (I+i (.), R
+
i (.))
she trades null contracts with each lender i ∈ {1, ..., K}. Thus, following the deviation, the
entrepreneur trades the null contract with each non-deviating investor, which implies that I0 =
I¯
N −K . When the entrepreneur chooses e = H , her payoff is bounded above by U(0) + (piHG−
1)(
I¯
N −K + I
+′(
I¯
N −K )), where I
+′(
I¯
N −K ) ≥ 0. Under default, the entrepreneur’s payoff is
bounded below by
Usd = B(
I¯
N −K + I
+′(
I¯
N −K ) +
N −K − 1
N −K I¯ +KI¯
+
i (
I¯
N −K )− A)− A
= U∗(I∗, R∗, H) +BI+
′
(
I¯
N −K ).
Thus, a sufficient condition for the entrepreneur to default is
U∗(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0) ≥ (piHG− 1−B)I+′( I¯
N −K ) + (piHG− 1)
I¯
N −K ,
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which corresponds to (A.8) established in the proof of Proposition 4.
Second, consider the case I ′ = 0. Again, because e = H is chosen at the deviation stage, the
entrepreneur does not trade latent contracts together with the deviating contract. Remark that we
must have I ′+(I0) > 0 for the deviation to be profitable. Furthermore, given the additional offers
(I+i (.), R
+
i (.)), the entrepreneur raises the amount I0 =
I∗
K
, or the amount I0 = I∗.
If the entrepreneur chooses I0 =
I∗
K
together with e = H , she must trade one equilibrium
contract at the deviating stage. The inequality I ′+(
I∗
K
) > 0 implies that IF (
I∗
K
) >
I∗
K
. Thus, given
R+i (.), the entrepreneur cannot get more than her reservation utility. Thus, when choosing e = H ,
she prefers not to trade the deviating contract.
The same logic applies if the entrepreneur chooses I0 = I∗ together with e = H . In that
case she must trade an equilibrium contract with each investor i ∈ {1, ..., K}. The inequality
I ′+(I∗) > 0 implies that IF (I∗) > I∗, and, given R+i (.), the entrepreneur cannot get more than her
reservation utility. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 (continued): The proof extends to the case in which investors can
write covenants contingent on the initial debt I0. Take any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) 6= (Ic, Rc)
supported in a symmetric equilibrium. Let
(
I
N
,
R(I∗)
N
,
I+(I)
N
,
R+(I, I∗)
N
)
be the equilibrium
trades of each lender, with I + I+(I) = I∗.
Let investor k deviate to the menu M ′k = ((0, 0, 0, 0), (
I
N
,
R(I∗)
N
, I+
′
k (.) + ε, R
+′
k (.))) with
ε > 0. The additional offer (I+
′
k (.), R
+′
k (.)) is such that
I+
′
k (I0) =

I∗ − I
N
− N − 1
N
piHR
∗ − I∗
piHG− 1 if I0 =
I
N
,
0 if I0 6= I
N
,
R+
′
k (I0, I
F (I0)) =

R+(I, I∗)
N
+
1
piH
(I ′+(
I
N
)− I
N
+ ε) + ε2 if I0 =
I
N
and IF (I0) =
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε,
G(IF (I0) + A) otherwise.
The logic developed in the first part of the proof applies to this more general case. If ε = 0, the
pair (
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε,
R(I∗)
N
+R+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε)) is such that
U(
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
),
R(I∗)
N
+R+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
)), H) = U(I∗, R∗, H)
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and piHR+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
))−I+′k (
I
N
) = piH
1
N
R+(I, I∗)− 1
N
I+(I). Since (I∗, R∗) 6= (Ic, Rc),
(
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+ε,
R(I∗)
N
+R+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+ε)) ∈ int(F) for ε small enough. The deviation
is designed to induce the entrepreneur to trade(
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+ε,
R(I∗)
N
+R+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+
ε)), and to choose e = H . Given M ′k, if the entrepreneur chooses e = H , she can get a payoff
above the equilibrium one by choosing (
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+ε,
R(I∗)
N
+R+
′
k (
I
N
,
I
N
+I+
′
k (
I
N
)+ε)) in the
deviating menu. In this case, however, givenR′k(.), she finds optimal to trade with investor k alone.
Thus, as long as ε > 0,M ′k is a profitable deviation for investor k whenever e = H is chosen. When
the entrepreneur chooses e = L, the only possibility to get a payoff above the equilibrium one is to
choose I0 =
I
N
. In this case, she trades the aggregate amount
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε+
N − 1
N
Iˆ+(
I
N
),
where
1
N
Iˆ+(
I
N
) denotes the largest additional investment offered in any equilibrium menu for
I0 =
I
N
. Given the equilibrium schedules in (22), the deviation is hence profitable if
U(I∗, R∗, H) + (piHG− 1− ε)ε+ N − 1
N
(1− δ)( I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε) >
B(
I
N
+ I+
′
k (
I
N
) + ε+
N − 1
N
Iˆ+(
I
N
) + A)− A. (A.25)
As in the first part of the proof, (A.25) is satisfied, since U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ B( I
N
+
N − 1
N
Iˆ+(
I
N
) +
A) − A by construction, piHG − 1 − ε > 0 for ε small enough, and δ < 1 − B. The rest of the
proof is a straightforward adaptation of the reasoning developed when I is only observed ex post.

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ADDITIONAL APPENDIX B: Indeterminacy with N ≥ 2
Proposition B.1 Take any N ≥ 2. If piHG − 1 > 2
√
piL
piH
, there exists an investment level I < Ic
such that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F with I∗ ≥ I can be supported at equilibrium.
PROOF: Assume
piHG− 1 > 2
√
piL
piH
. (B.1)
We first establish a set of relationships that will be used throughout the proof. First, from (1) we
get
G− B
∆pi
> G+
piLG− 1
∆pi
=
piHG− 1
∆pi
>
2
∆pi
√
piL
piH
, (B.2)
where the last inequality follows from (B.1).
Second, given (B.1), (1) and (4) together imply that37
1− piH
∆pi
B > 2
√
piL
piH
piL
∆pi
and
piH
∆pi
B > 2
√
piL
piH
.
Adding the two conditions, one gets
1 > 2
√
piLpiH
∆pi
⇔
√
piH
piL
−
√
piL
piH
> 2 ⇔
(√
piH
piL
− 1
)2
> 2,
which yields√
piH
piL
> 1 +
√
2,
√
piL
piH
<
√
2− 1 and piH > (3 + 2
√
2)piL. (B.3)
We now turn to the proof of Proposition B.1. It is useful to characterize equilibrium allo-
cations in terms of two parameters, which we denote ε and η. Precisely, let (ε, η) ∈ [0, ε] ×[
piH
(
G− B
∆pi
)
, 1
]
, with
ε =
1
N
min
(
∆pi
B
(G− 1
piH
),
piHG− 1
B
− piL
piH∆pi
1
G− B
∆pi
,
(
1− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
)
B
2B + (1− piHG)
)
.
Observe that (1) and (4) imply that ∆pi
B
(G − 1
piH
) ∈ (0, 1), and, given (B.2), both the second and
third terms are strictly positive. Thus, we get 0 < Nε < 1. Consider now the aggregate allocation
(Iε, Rεη) =
(
Ic(1− ε), 1
piH
Ic(1− ηε)
)
. It is immediate to check that, if e = H , the aggregate profit
37It is useful to rewrite (1) as piHG− 1 < ∆pi
piL
(1− piH
∆pi
B), and (4) as piHG− 1<piH
∆pi
B.
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piHR
ε
η − Iε is strictly decreasing in η. See also that ∀ε ∈ [0, ε], Iε > Im.38 Letting I = Iε > Im,
and considering all (ε, η) ∈ [0, ε]× [piH (G− B∆pi) , 1], one can hence generate a closed subset of
F including all aggregate allocations (Iε, Rεη) ∈ F such that Iε ≥ I . The subset is represented in
the dashed area in Figure 3.
I
R
O I
•C
m
•C
c
Rm
Im
Rc
Ic
H
L
Ψ
F
1
piH
G− B
∆pi
Figure 3: Set of aggregate allocations (Iε, Rεη)
Consider now any allocation (Iε, Rεη) such that I
ε ≥ I , and denote it (I∗, R∗). We show that it is
supported at equilibrium by the following strategies, which are similar to those used in the proof of
Proposition 3. Each investor i = 1, 2, ..., N offers the same menuM∗ = {(0, 0), (I∗
N
,R∗(.)
)
,
( Iˆ
N
, Rˆ(.)
)},
with R∗(I) = G(I + A) for I /∈ {I∗, I
∗
N
}, and
R∗(I) =

R∗
N
if I = I∗,
R∗ − N − 1
N
GI∗ if I =
I∗
N
.
(B.4)
The investment level Iˆ is such that
B(Iˆ + A)− A = U(I∗, R∗, H) = U c − εIc(piHG− η), (B.5)
which guarantees, given that U(I∗, R∗, H) ≥ B(I∗ + A) − A whenever (I∗, R∗) ∈ F , that Iˆ >
I∗ ≥ 0.
As in the proof of Proposition 3, one can check that choosing the investment
I∗
N
in each menu
and selecting e = H is an optimal choice for the entrepreneur. Consider now investors’ deviations.
38Indeed, Ic
(
1− ∆pi
B
(
G− 1
piH
))
=
∆pi
B
(
G− B
∆pi
)
A = Im and ε <
∆pi
B
(
G− 1
piH
)
.
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Without loss of generality, any unilateral deviation can be represented by a menu M ′ = {(I∗
N
+
I ′,
R∗
N
+ R′(.)
)
, (0, 0)}. A profitable deviation must necessarily induces e = H ,39 and one must
have that
R′(I) >
1
piH
I ′,
with I being the aggregate investment traded at the deviation stage, and that I ′ ≤ Ic − I
∗
N
. If,
following the deviation, the entrepreneur chooses e = L and strategically defaults, then, given
(B.5), she gets
Usd = U(I
∗, R∗, H) +B
(
I ′ +
I∗
N
− Iˆ
N
)
.
Assume first that the entrepreneur only trades with the deviating investor. In this case, choosing
e = H yields her the payoff
piH
(
G(
I∗
N
+ I ′+A)− R
∗
N
−R′(I
∗
N
+ I ′)
)+−A < U(0)(N − 1) + U(I∗, R∗, H)
N
+ (piHG− 1)I ′.
Since the entrepreneur’s equilibrium utility remains available at the deviation stage, the right-hand
side of the last inequality must be strictly greater than U(I∗, R∗, H), which implies that I ′ > 0.
The entrepreneur therefore finds optimal to strategically default if
N − 1
N
(
U(I∗, R∗, H)− U(0))− B
N
(Iˆ − I∗) ≥ (piHG− 1−B)I ′. (B.6)
The left-hand side being increasing with N , a sufficient condition for (B.6) obtains with N = 2.
That is, after rearranging: B(I∗ + A) − piHGA ≥ 2(piHG − 1 − B)I ′ or B(Ic + A) − piHGA ≥
BεIc+2(piHG−1−B)I ′. See that B(Ic+A)−piHGA = − piL
∆pi
B(Ic+A)+(piHG−1)Ic which
leads to the condition:
piHG− 1 ≥ f(I ′, ε), (B.7)
39Indeed, given Lemma 1, a deviating investor may achieve a positive profit by inducing e = L only if the en-
trepreneur trades several contracts out of equilibrium and does not default. Given equilibrium menus, this is only
possible if the entrepreneur invests I = I∗ and selects e = L; this in turn provides her a payoff smaller than the
equilibrium one, which guarantees that this is not an optimal choice.
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with f(I ′, ε) = B
(
piL
∆pi
Ic + A
Ic
+ ε
)
+ 2(piHG− 1−B) I
′
Ic
. Given the linearity of f , we have that
f(I ′, ε) = f
(
I ′
Ic
(Ic, 0) + (1− I
′
Ic
)
(
0,
ε
1− I′
Ic
))
=
I ′
Ic
f(Ic, 0) + (1− I
′
Ic
)f
(
0,
ε
1− I′
Ic
)
.
To prove (B.7), using 0 < I ′ ≤ N−1
N
Ic < Ic, we simply need to show that
piHG− 1 ≥ f(Ic, 0), (B.8)
piHG− 1 ≥ f
(
0,
ε
1− I′
Ic
)
. (B.9)
Condition (B.8) is equivalent toB
(
2− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
)
≥ piHG−1, which holds sinceB
(
2− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
)
>
B
(
2− 1
2
√
piL
piH
)
> B(2 − 1
2
(
√
2 − 1)) > B
1− (3− 2√2) >
piH
∆pi
B ≥ piHG − 1. The first in-
equality comes from (B.2), the second and the fourth from (B.3) and the last one is (4). To prove
(B.9), first remark that (B.7) holds for any couple (0, ε) with ε ≤ Nε. Indeed, by definition of ε,
we have ε ≤ piHG− 1
B
− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
for any ε ≤ Nε. To complete the proof of (B.9), observe
that, since I ′ ≤ N−1
N
Ic and ε ≤ ε, we have
ε
1− I′
Ic
≤ 1
N
Nε
1− I′
Ic
≤ 1
N
Nε
1− N−1
N
= Nε.
Assume next that several contracts are traded at the deviation stage. Getting back to the proof
of Proposition 3, following any unilateral deviation, the entrepreneur strategically defaults if (17)
holds. Again, the left-hand side of (17) is increasing in k. A sufficient condition for (17) is
therefore, using (B.5) and I∗ = Ic(1− ε)
BIc
(
1− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
)
≥ εIc(2B + 1− piHG),
which is equivalent to ε ≤ B
2B + (1− piHG)
(
1− piL
∆pi
1/piH
G− B
∆pi
)
. The inequality holds by defi-
nition of ε, which concludes the proof that (I∗, R∗) is supported at equilibrium. 
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ADDITIONAL APPENDIX C: Seniority under bankruptcy
Proposition C.1 For sufficiently small values of piL, if one investor is repaid first in case of default,
then every allocation characterized in Proposition 4 can be supported at equilibrium.
PROOF: Fix N such that the set of allocations satisfying (6) is non-empty. Consider any strategy
profile introduced in the proof of Proposition 4 with the equilibrium allocation (I∗, R∗) and let j
be the investor whose claim is senior in case of default. We show that if piL is sufficiently small,
this investor cannot profitably deviate inducing strategic default. Let M ′j = {(0, 0), (I ′j, R′j(.))}
be a deviating menu with R′j(I) = G(I + A) ∀I the repayment that maximizes investor j’s profit
in case of default. Suppose first that j ∈ {1, · · · , K}. Given equilibrium covenants, (I ′j, R′j(.))
induces the entrepreneur to strategically default only if
U(I∗, R∗, H) = B(I¯ + I∗ + A)− A < B(I ′j +
K − 1
K
I∗ + I¯ + A)− A,
which corresponds to
I ′j >
I∗
K
. (C.1)
A sufficient condition for the deviation not to be profitable is that it yields a strictly negative profit,
that is
(piLG− 1)I ′j + piLG(I¯ +
K − 1
K
I∗ + A) < 0. (C.2)
For a given N , it follows from Proposition 4 that
I∗
K
> 0 at equilibrium. See that the strict
inequalities (C.1) and (C.2) are satisfied for piL = 0. By continuity, one can then construct an
open neighborhood of pi∗L = 0 such that, for each piL in this interval, any I
′
j that satisfies (C.1) also
satisfies (C.2).
The same reasoning applies to the case j ∈ {K + 1, · · · , N}. 
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ADDITIONAL APPENDIX D: Reducing B under bankruptcy
We consider the following bankruptcy mechanism. Before the game is played, an authority
commits to reduce the entrepreneur’s private benefit to some B′ = λB with λ ∈ (0, 1) after
observing R > G(I + A). We then have the following proposition.
Proposition D.1 Assume piL = 0 and consider an economy with a bankruptcy mechanism of pa-
rameter λ. If
λ > max
(
piHG− 1
B
, 1− (piHG−B)piHG− 1
B
)
, (D.1)
there exists an investment level Iλ such that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F with I ≥ Iλ
can be supported at equilibrium.
PROOF: Consider first any array of parameters (piH , piL, G,B) such that piL = 0 and (1) and
(4) are satisfied. Observe that, in this case, (4) can be written
piHG− 1
B
< 1, which implies
1 − (piHG − B)piHG− 1
B
> 0. Construct then a modified array of parameters, by replacing B
with any B′ = λB, with λ satisfying (D.1). We refer to these parameters as the economy Eλ.
We denote Fλ its feasibility set and Imλ (Icλ) the corresponding monopoly (competitive) investment
level. Observe that since G− λB
∆pi
> G− B
∆pi
, we have
F ⊂ Fλ, Ic ≤ Icλ. (D.2)
We know from Proposition 3 that any aggregate allocation (I∗, R∗) ∈ F satisfying I∗ ≥ Im can
be sustained at equilibrium. This implies that any (I∗, R∗) ∈ Fλ with I∗ ≥ Imλ can be sustained at
equilibrium in Eλ with the symmetric menus Mλ = {(0, 0), (I∗
N
,R∗(.)
)
,
( Iˆ
N
, Rˆ(.)
)}, where R∗(.)
and Rˆ(.) are defined as in the proof of Proposition 3, and
λB(Iˆ + A)− A = U(I∗, R∗, H). (D.3)
Simple manipulations lead to Imλ + A =
piHG
λB
A and Ic + A =
1/piH
1
piH
− (G− B
piH
)
A. The inequal-
ity (D.1) therefore implies that
Imλ < I
c. (D.4)
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Define Iλ = Imλ until the end of the proof.
We now turn to the original economy, identified by the parameters array (piH , piL = 0, G,B)
and suppose that a bankruptcy mechanism is introduced. Consider any (I∗, R∗) ∈ F such that
I∗ ≥ Iλ. We show that the menu Mλ defined above supports (I∗, R∗) at equilibrium even in the
presence of a bankruptcy mechanism.
Observe first that when the entrepreneur chooses an investment different from I∗ or
I∗
N
at
equilibrium, covenants ensure that she strategically defaults obtaining B′(I+A).40 As in the proof
of Proposition 3, choosing
I∗
N
in each menu and selecting e = H is an optimal choice for the
entrepreneur by (D.3).41
Consider now investors’ deviations. As in the proof of Proposition 3, any unilateral devi-
ation can be represented by a menu M ′ = {(I∗
N
+ I ′,
R∗
N
+ R′(.)
)
, (0, 0)} and must induce
the entrepreneur to choose e = H to be profitable. See that by (D.4) and (D.2), any allocation
(I∗, R∗) ∈ F with I∗ ≥ Iλ is also supported at equilibrium with the menus Mλ in the economy
Eλ. This establishes that the same allocation is supported at equilibrium in the original economy
when a bankruptcy mechanism is in place. 
40That is, she cannot select e = L without triggering the bankruptcy mechanism.
41If the entrepreneur accepts
I∗
N
in each menu and chooses e = L, we necessary have B(I∗ + A) − A ≤
U(I∗, R∗, H) since (I∗, R∗) ∈ F .
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